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The phenomenon of statelessness and its repercussions typically con-
jure images of refugees forced into a nomadic life by unfortunate circum-
stances, most often due to war.1 Consider, however, the more atypical
situation of the stateless, and most unfortunate, Alfred Merhan:
It's a weekday morning in Charles de Gaulle Airport's Terminal One, and
passengers are sipping coffee and passing time until they ride the glass-
enclosed escalators to their planes and fly away. One man, however, has been
waiting here patiently for a flight for the last 9 2 years! Merhan Karimi Nas-
seri, nicknamed Alfred by the airport staff, sits on a red plastic bench and
writes the day's entry in his loose-leaf diary. In August 1988, Mr. Nasseri
landed at Charles de Gaulle Airport with no documents, the result of bureau-
cratic bungling and a string of bad luck. Since then, Europe's increasingly
strict immigration and refugee laws and Mr. Nasseri's deteriorating mental
state have kept him trapped in a sort of legal no man's land. Mr. Nasseri, 48,
frail with thinning dark hair, sunken eyes and hollow cheeks, says he still has
hope that he will one day leave the airport. But the airport workers who watch
out for him say they think he is there for good .... [Mr. Nasseri] was born in
Soleiman, a part of Iran then under British jurisdiction, to an Iranian father and
" Associate Professor of International Law; Graduate School of Business, University of
Texas at Austin. The author gratefully acknowledges the invaluable assistance of Meredith
Pierce, B.A., Louisiana State University, 1996; J.D. expected, University of Texas at Austin,
1999.
1 The United Nations Commissioner for Refugees provides a moving website that high-
lights the plight of refugees. The site contains maps, photographs, statistics and other rele-
vant information, all of which prove disturbing. See United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (visited Feb. 20, 1999) <http://www.unhcr.ch>.
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sue a postgraduate course. When he returned to Iran, he was imprisoned for
protesting against the shah and expelled without a passport. In Europe, Mr.
Nasseri bounced from capital to capital for nearly four years and applied for
political asylum in several countries. In 1981, the United Nations High Com-
mission for Refugees in Belgium granted his request, giving him refugee cre-
dentials that allowed him to seek citizenship in a European country. Mr.
Nasseri decided on Britain, but he got only as far as Paris, where his briefcase
containing the refugee certificate was stolen in a train station. Several months
later, Mr. Nasseri boarded a plane for London anyway, showing French police
a copy of the theft report. British immigration officers sent him back to
France. French police arrested him, but because he had no official documents,
there was no country to which he could be deported. He has been in the airport
ever since.... 2
Besides serving as a damning critique of bureaucracy at its extreme,
this story reflects only one of the many alarming results of statelessness.
Stateless persons may not participate in politics; states may deny them ac-
cess to courts; stateless persons may be liable for taxes wherever they hap-
pen to be; they may, under international law, be subject to discrimination
since they belong to no state capable of protecting them.3
Statelessness clearly implicates issues concerning basic human rights.
The United Nations has addressed some of these issues by taking steps to
reduce statelessness and to minimize its results, most notably with the Con-
vention on the Reduction of Statelessness and the Convention Relating to
the Status of Stateless Persons.4 Although mitigating the effects of state-
lessness is noble and quite worthwhile, these efforts may fail to reach cer-
tain stateless persons, and, more specifically, certain stateless entities.5
2 Susannah Patton, Man May Never Leave Airport Refuge, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
March 11, 1998, at 12A (emphasis added). Mr. Nasseri's plight is amplified by the dearth of
entertainment common to airports around the globe:
Mr. Nasseri's routine has varied little over the last 9 2 years. Every night after the stores
close, he settles down to sleep on the padded plastic bench, wrapped in a navy blue nylon
sleeping bag. He awakens about 5:30 a.m., when activity begins to stir in the terminal,
and heads to the washroom to shave and brush his teeth with toiletries from complimen-
tary airline kits. His meals, mostly from Burger King and surrounding cafes, come
largely courtesy of airport staff members, who give him meal vouchers. 'French fries are
my favorite,' he confides. 'It's not a very health diet, but I get enough.' Once a week he
washes his only shirt, which dries in two hours. His jacket and corduroy pants are
cleaned by the airport laundry, and he showers in staff facilities. The rest of his day is
spent chatting with passing staff members, writing in his diary and reading his most re-
cent volume from the Book-of-the-Month Club, which he is able to pay for with dona-
tions from journalists who have befriended him over the years....
Id.
3 See MvRns S. McDOUGAL, HAROLD, D. LASSWELL, LuNG-CHU CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS
& WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 921 (1980).
4 See id. at 936.
5 Besides the United Nations and various governments, private groups strive to solve the
problems presented by statelessness. In 1978, one such group established a home for the
stateless in Thailand (the Old People's Home). Currently, the home accepts no new resi-
dents because the Thai government has instituted measures to aid the stateless. See
<http:l/wvw.cybemet.netl-rsmall/oldpeo.htm>.
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Enter Matimak Trading Company ("Matimak"), a corporation formed
under the laws of, and with its principal place of business in, Hong Kong.
Recently, the U.S. Second Circuit Court of Appeals deemed Matimak to be
"stateless" due to Hong Kong's status as a dependent territory and Great
Britain's nationality law.6 The court dismissed the case for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction since Matimak failed to meet one of the criteria set out in
the Alienage Diversity statute, being a citizen of a foreign state.7
Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily deviates from the opinions reached by
other circuits when confronted with the citizenship issue of corporations
formed under the laws of British Dependent Territories.8 Wilson v. Hum-
phreys (Cayman) Ltd. best illustrates this departure.9 In Wilson, the Sev-
enth Circuit held that a Cayman Islands corporation, although incorporated
under the laws of a British Dependent Territory, was a citizen of a "foreign
state" under the Alien Diversity statute.10 It therefore could access United
6 See Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily, 118 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.
Ct. 883 (1998).
7 See id. The Alienage Diversity statute reads: "[t]he district courts shall have original ju-
risdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between citizens of a State and citizens or
subjects of a foreign state." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (1997).
8 Presently, the British Dependent Territories are Anguilla, Bermuda, British Antarctic
Territory, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands, Gibralter, Montserrat,
Pitcaim Islands, Saint Helena, Saint Helena Dependencies, South Georgia and the South
Sandwich Islands, and Turks and Caicos Islands. See Britain in the U.S.A.: Britain's De-
pendent Territories (visited Jan. 17, 1998)
<http://britain.nyc.ny.us/bistext/fordom/dts/dts.htm>. In addition, other entities exist as de-
pendent territories. France's dependent territories are Bassas da India, Clipperton Island,
Europa Island, French Polynesia, French Southern and Antarctic Islands, Glorioso Islands,
Juan de Nova Island, New Caledonia, Tromelin Island, and Wallis and Futuna. See Central
Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 1997 (visited Jan. 17, 1998)
<http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/pubs.html>. The Netherlands' dependent territories
are Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles. See id. Furthermore, Australia, the United States
and Portugal maintain dependencies, although Macau, Portugal's only dependency, is
"scheduled to become a Special Administrative Region of China" on December 20, 1999.
Id. Note that many of these locales are tax havens. Among those more commonly known
are Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Netherlands Antilles, Turks
and Caicos Islands, and U.S. Virgin Islands. See generally MILTON GRUNDY, OFFSHORE
BUSINESS CENTERS: A WORLD SURVEY (1997). Thus, the Second Circuit's holding intro-
duces into the world of tax structuring an element of unpredictability, leaving the question of
whether the United States federal courts may exercise subject matter jurisdiction over corpo-
rations formed under laws of dependent territories unanswered.
9 See Wilson v. Humphreys (Cayman) Ltd., 916 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
499 U.S. 947 (1991).
10 The opinion is vague as to which "foreign state" the Cayman Islands corporation
should be considered a citizen: the Cayman Islands or Great Britain. The opinion holds that
"[t]he Cayman Islands is a British Dependent Territory. A citizen of a British Dependent
Territory is a 'citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies."' Id. at 1242 (citing British Na-
tionality Act 1981 § 51(3)(a)(ii)).
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States federal courts." These irreconcilable decisions leave similarly situ-
ated corporations in a jurisdictional twilight zone where their ability to enter
a federal courthouse is questionable. This inconsistent treatment of foreign
corporations by the courts of appeals could have international ramifica-
tions.' 2 A remedy imposing certainty is crucial.
" See id.
12 One example of foreign governments reacting to what they perceive as a threat to their
interests can be found in the area of extraterritorial exercise of United States law, notably the
extraterritorial application of American antitrust law, the Export Administration Act, and se-
curities laws. See JAMEs ATWOOD, KiNGMAN BREWSTER, ANnTRUST & AMERICAN BusINEss
ABROAD 94 (1981). Recently, extraterritorial application has made news through the Helms-
Burton Act which "exercises extraterritorial jurisdiction in an attempt to impose economic
sanctions on [American] trading partners who do business with Cuba." John Yoo, Federal
Courts as Weapons of Foreign Policy: The Case of the Helms-Burton Act, 20 HASTINGS
IN"'L & COMP. L. REv. 747 (1997). There are several reasons for foreign resentment of the
extraterritorial application of American laws. The first rationale for foreign resentment rests
with the idea that, while other countries often concur with the ends underlying a particular
American law, the foreign country prefers other, perhaps less formal, preventative means.
See ATWOOD, supra at 83. For example, Canadian antitrust law is based on "[i]nformal ne-
gotiation and the threat of bad publicity [which] result[s] in the resolution of most disputes
prior to formal action." Id. at 84. On the other hand, foreign countries simply may not sup-
port the American law being applied beyond American borders. See id. at 86. Finally, and
perhaps most apparent, is the feeling that extraterritorial application of U.S. laws offends
notions of state sovereignty. See id. at 92.
Foreign governments have reacted in the past to perceived injustices inflicted upon their
citizens when U.S. law is applied abroad. The most common reaction occurs via diplomatic
channels in the form of messages or "filing briefs amici curiae." Id. at 101. Foreign courts,
supported by their governments, have refused to acknowledge American antitrust rulings
and, more commonly, dismiss American discovery demands. See id. at 102. Foreign legis-
latures reveal their resentment through legislation which blocks extraterritorial investigations
or defeats American judgments. See id. at 102-05. One example of this occurring is the
Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980 passed by the British Parliament. The Act contains
a "clawback provision" which allows "certain defendants who [had] paid a multiple damage
judgment in an overseas country to recover the multiple portion of that judgment from the
successful plaintiff." Joseph E. Neuhaus, Power to Reverse Foreign Judgments: The British
Clawback Statute Under International Law, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1097, 1098 (1981). The act
was "aimed at the treble damages available under the United States antitrust laws. . ." and
was "a response to a perceived increase in the aggressively extraterritorial enforcement of
American antitrust and trade law." Id. at 1098-99. Australia and Canada passed similar acts.
See id. at 1098.
A more recent example is the passage of "clawback" statutes enacted by most of Amer-
ica's trading partners to mitigate the effects of the Helms-Burton Act. The European Com-
munity adopted Council Regulation 2771/96. The Regulation "prohibits, in categorical
terms, the recognition and enforcement of any judgment of a court as well as any decision of
an administrative authority located outside of the European Community giving effect to the
Helms-Burton Act or the D'Amato Act or to actions based thereon or resulting therefrom."
Jurgen Huber, The Helms-Burton Blocking Statute of the European Union, 20 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 699, 704 (1997). The Regulation also contains a "clawback clause" whereby
Helms-Burton defendants can recover expenses from Helms-Burton plaintiffs incurred dur-
ing litigation. Id. at 705. Canada enacted similar legislation. See Kim Campbell, Helms-
Burton: The Canadian View, 20 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 799, 803 (1997). "Mex-
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 19:130 (1998)
This article investigates methods to alleviate this intercircuit conflict.
Part II of this article examines the potential effects of statelessness on cor-
porations such as Matimak and the role of alienage jurisdiction within the
federal court system. Part III serves as an introduction to executive recog-
nition of foreign states. Part IV contrasts and discusses the Matimak and
Wilson opinions. Part V presents three possible solutions to the conflict and
concludes that a congressional amendment to the Alienage Diversity statute
would most likely resolve this conflict. An amendment would inject pre-
dictability into the process by which courts of appeals decide the status of
foreign parties. This resolution would foster the separation of powers in-
herent in our legal system and allow the political branches the final word in
matters involving international policy.
II. STATELESSNESS AND ALIENAGE JURISDICTION
A. Statelessness
Under international law, the stateless person or entity, as in Matimak's
situation, lacks what can be termed the "right to have rights" that nationals
enjoy.1 3 Admittedly this term seems overly encompassing but in actuality
that is the case with statelessness. Under international principles of law,
nationality grants an individual or entity protection by its state. Any harm
done to a national is imputed to the state itself.15 Thus, the state is justified
in taking action on behalf of an injured national.' 6 Without a state of na-
tionality, the stateless individual or entity has no grounds to complain (nor
anyone to hear those complaints) when it experiences discrimination. 7 In
other words, stateless individuals or entities have no "community willing
and able to guarantee any rights whatsoever.' '18 The stateless individual in
particular:
ico has stated that it will continue to use every legal means within its reach to contest the ex-
traterritorial aspects of the Helms-Burton Act, in order to limit its impact and to protect the
legitimate interests of those Mexicans who might be affected thereby." Mexico's Position
Regarding the Helms-Burton Act and Cuba, 20 HASTINGS INT'L & COMp. L. Rv. 809, 812
(1997).
13 See McDoUGAL ET AL, supra note 3, at 920.
14 See id.
15 See id. at 866-67.
Whoever ill-treats a citizen indirectly injures the State, which must protect that citizen.
The sovereign of the injured citizen must avenge the deed and, if possible, force the ag-
gressor to give full satisfaction or punish him, since otherwise the citizen will not obtain
the chief end of civil society, which is protection.
Id. at 867 (quoting 3 E. DE VATrEL, CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE LAW OF
NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW 136 (C. Fenwick trans. 1916)).
16 See id. at 866.
17Seeid. at 921.18 Id. (quoting H. ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 20 (1958)).
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has no state to 'protect' him and lacks even the freedom of movement to find a
state that is willing to protect him. His participation in the value processes of
any territorial community is highly restricted.... The powerlessness of the
stateless person is most apparent in the limitation upon his freedom of move-
ment, both of egress and of return.... Other deprivations are visited upon the
stateless individual. He is denied general participation, such as voting and of-
fice holding, in the internal power process of any body politic. He often can-
not obtain documents certifying his personal status .... The stateless person
may be discriminated against in every territorial community because of his al-
ienage; he is not properly recognized as a person and is thus denied respect.
1 9
While it appears that many of these restrictions would not affect enti-
ties such as corporations, potential discrimination is of primary concern.
This concern intensifies if the entity is stateless since, under international
law, the stateless entity is unprotected against discrimination. 20  Kevin
Johnson documents examples of discrimination aimed at foreign corporate
litigants in the United States.21 He cites two particular state jury verdicts
reversed by the Supreme Court arguably due to fears of discrimination
against the foreign defendants.22 Alienage jurisdiction, and thereby access
to federal court, alleviates some of the threats of discrimination foreign liti-
gants may face in state court. However, stateless entities cannot avail them-
selves of the Alienage Diversity statute. According to Matimak,
corporations from dependent territories have no choice but to turn to state
courts.23 The next section discusses the origins of alienage jurisdiction and
its purposes in relation to today's foreign corporate litigants.
'9 Id. at 920-21. The United Nations has addressed statelessness and taken steps to re-
duce and statelessness and minimize its effects. See id. at 935-41. The Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness, the Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, and
the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees were adopted. See id. However, the lan-
guage of these Conventions seems to preclude application to stateless entities such as corpo-
rations. See Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, Sept. 20, 1954, 360
U.N.T.S. 117 (purpose of Convention is to include those persons not covered by the Con-
vention relating to the Status of Refugees). Thus, even in contracting states, it would seem a
plausible argument exists against applying the principles contained in these Conventions to
stateless entities.2 0 See MCDOUGAL Er AL, supra note 3, at 921.
21 See Kevin Johnson, Why Alienage Jurisdiction? Historical Foundations and Modern
Justifications for Federal Jurisdiction Over Disputes Involving Noncitizens, 21 YALE J.
INT'L L. 1, 46 (1996).
2 See id. at 46-47. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994) (reversing $5 mil-
lion punitive damages against foreign defendant); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia,
S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984) (reversing a $1 million jury verdict against a foreign de-
fendant).
23 This is assuming the foreign litigant could not invoke federal jurisdiction via other,
more narrowly tailored, statutes available such as federal question jurisdiction. See Mati-
mak, 118 F.3d at 88 ("Matimak is not a 'citizen or subject of a foreign state,' under 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2), and there is no basis for jurisdiction over Matimak's suit."); infra note
33 and accompanying text.
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B. Alienage Jurisdiction
1. Purposes ofAlienage Jurisdiction
What purposes does alienage jurisdiction serve? As usual, history aids
in searching for future answers. Johnson argues that concern about interna-
tional relations is a constant theme of alienage jurisdiction.24 During colo-
nial times and throughout the American Revolution, anti-British sentiment
was prevalent.25 After the Revolutionary War, "[t]he states often failed to
enforce debts owed by their citizens to British creditors. This problem grew
as the U.S. economy experienced fluctuations and readjustments caused by,
among other factors, the loss of British financial support. ' 26 Though the
national government took steps to prevent this from happening, the loosely
based government of the Articles of Confederation permitted the states to
remain recalcitrant.27  As a result, Federalists feared that the fledgling
country could not "attract capital absent easier enforcement of commercial
obligations owed to foreign citizens by U.S. citizens. A national court sys-
tem was considered one solution. 28 Thus, at the Constitutional Conven-
tion, a general agreement emerged that alienage diversity jurisdiction was
necessary to further America's economic growth; for example "[f]our of the
five plans presented at the Constitutional Convention provided for alienage
jurisdiction. ' 29 The resulting constitutional provision reads, "The judicial
Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, .... between a State, or
the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects., 30 As for the
Judiciary Act of 1789, Johnson argues that the First Congress passed an al-
ienage diversity statute for much the same reasons as those of the framers:
foreign relations and the desire to encourage a flow of capital to the United
States.
31
Today, alienage jurisdiction serves a similar purpose by preventing
potential discrimination against foreign litigants in state courts. Federal
courts are commonly perceived as being more neutral than state courts.
This proposition may be debatable however, according to Johnson:
Concern with foreign business frequently has been strongest at the state
and local levels ... [E]xamples of antiforeign sentiment directed at foreign
business abound. So-called Arab oil money in the 1970s and the Japanese 'in-
24 See Johnson, supra note 21, at 3.
25 See id. at 6-7.261d. at 7.
27 See id. at 8.
28 id.
29 Id. at 10.30 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
31 See Johnson, supra note 21, at 20; Wythe Holt, The Origins ofAlienage Jurisdiction,
14 OKLA. CrrY U. L. REV. 547, 548 (1989) (arguing that "historically the single most im-
portant grant of national court jurisdiction embodied in the [1789 Judiciary] Act was the
grant over alienage cases .... ).
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vasion' of the economy in the 1980s triggered hysterical reaction from some
commentators. Though more subtle, the debate over whether Congress should
ratify the North American Free Trade Agreement resonated with a distinctively
negative view of Mexican capital and labor.32
If the aforementioned proposition is taken as true, alienage jurisdiction
provides a neutral vehicle through which foreigners can adjudicate disputes.
Interestingly, the policies underlying alienage jurisdiction persist despite
two centuries of colossal change in the American and global economies.
2. 4lienage Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts
Our federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.33 As previously
enumerated, the Constitution expounds the outer limits of alienage jurisdic-
tion for the federal courts: "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, ... between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign
States, Citizens or Subjects. 34 Congress further delineated such jurisdic-
tion in 28 U.S.C. §1332(a)(2) which reads: "The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy ex-
ceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is
between citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state."35
The common thread that binds these jurisdictional decrees is the term
"foreign state," conspicuously left undefined both in the Constitution and
the diversity statute. The Matimak court acknowledged that "[n]either the
Constitution nor § 1332(a)(2) defines 'foreign state,' however, '[ilt has
generally been held that a foreign state is one formally recognized by the
executive branch of the United States government."'37 Thus, for corpora-
32 Johnson, supra note 21, at 45.
33 See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 27-28 (4th ed. 1994).
[Federal courts] are empowered to hear only such cases as are within the judicial power
of the United States, as defined in the Constitution, and have been entrusted to them by ajurisdictional grant by Congress. Because of this unusual nature of the federal courts, and
because it would be not simply wrong but indeed an unconstitutional invasion of the
povers reserved to the states if those courts were to entertain cases not within their juris-
diction, the rule is well settled that the party seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal
court must demonstrate that the case is within the competence of such a court...[P]arties cannot confer on a federal court jurisdiction that has not been vested in the court
by the Constitution and Congress. The parties cannot waive lack ofjurisdiction, whether
by express consent, or by conduct, or even by estoppel.
Id.
34 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
3'28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (1997).
36 28 U.S.C. §1603 which addresses foreign sovereign immunities defines the breadth of
"foreign state" for purposes of that chapter. "A 'foreign state' ... includes a political subdi-
vision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state as defined in sub-
section (b)."
37 Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily, 118 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.
Ct. 883 (1998).
Because the Constitution empowers only the President to 'receive Ambassadors and other
public Ministers,' the courts have deferred to the executive branch when determining
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tions, 38 those incorporated abroad are deemed citizens of a foreign state
only if that foreign state is recognized.39 Therefore, those corporations not
meeting this criterion are deemed stateless.40 The next section considers the
theory behind recognition in international law. The section also considers
the role given recognition by the federal courts.
]I. RECOGNITION
A. Recognition Theory
Before turning to the Matimak and Wilson cases, the terminology of
the recognition of states demands introduction. Recognition has been de-
fined as the "acknowledgment of the existence of an entity or situation indi-
what entities shall be considered foreign states. The recognition of foreign states and of
foreign governments, therefore, is wholly a prerogative of the executive branch."
Iran Handicraft and Carpet Export Center v. MarJan International Corporation, 655 F. Supp.
1275, 1277 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
38 See Nat. Steam-Ship Co. v. Tugman, 106 U.S. 118, 121 (1882) ("a corporation of a
foreign state is, for purposes of jurisdiction in the courts of the United States, to be deemed,
constructively, a citizen or subject of such state.") Congress passed 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)
which defines corporate citizenship: "For purposes of this section... a corporation shall be
deem6d to be a citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where
it has its principal place of business .... " 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1997).
The draftsmen of the 1958 amendment t28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)] did not consider how it
would apply to cororations incorporated in a foreign country or to domestic corporations
with their principal place of business abroad... More recent cases [ I hold( ] that a for-
eign corporation is considered a citizen of the state or foreign state in which it has its
principal place of business. It has also been held that a domestic corporation is a citizen
of the state of its incorporation, but that it is not to be regarded as a citizen of a foreign
country even though it has its principal place of business in that country.
WRiGHT, supra note 33, at 168-69.
Another interesting twist to the foreign corporation equation is discussed in Cohn v. Ro-
senfeld wherein the court was faced with an "Anstalt" from Liechtenstein, as opposed to a
corporation. The court held that "[s]ection 1332(a)(2) applies to foreign legal entities of all
kinds, so long as the entity is considered a juridical person under the law that created it."
Cohn v. Rosenfeld, 733 F.2d 625, 629 (9th Cir. 1983).
39 See Land Oberoesterreich v. Gude, 109 F.2d 635, 637 (2d Cir. 1940) ("The state must
first achieve recognition by our government, but once recognized, the foreign sovereign, its
subjects and citizens, including its corporations may be suitors in our courts."); World
Communications Corp. v. Micronesian Telecomm. Corp., 456 F. Supp. 1122 (D. Haw. 1978)
(a corporation formed under the laws of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands not a citi-
zen of a foreign state).
40 See Matimak, 118 F.3d at 86 ("Matimak is not a 'citizen or subject' of a foreign state.
It is thus stateless."). In the context of natural, stateless persons, see Shoemaker v. Malaxa,
241 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1957) ("it seems clear that a stateless person .... is not a citizen or
subject of a foreign state within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(a)(2)); Factor v. Pen-
nington Press, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 630, 634 (N.D. I11. 1964) ("The plaintiff was at the time of
filing the complaint a stateless person, and a stateless person is not a citizen of a state of the
United States or of any foreign state for purposes of satisfying the diversity of citizenship
requirements."); Reyes v. Penoci, 202 F. Supp. 436 (D. P.R. 1962) ("A stateless person...
is not a citizen or subject of a foreign state .... ).
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cating that the full legal consequences of that existence will be respected. ' '
Recognition can be extended to states, governments and to governments'
decrees.42  These different types of recognition are separate forms.
43
Nonetheless, the nomenclature of overnmental recognition seems applica-
ble to that of recognition of states. For example, in analyzing state recog-
nition the Matimak court looked to jurisprudence surrounding the meaning
of "foreign state" as contained in § 1332(a)(4), the section granting federal
courts jurisdiction over foreign sovereign immunities cases. The court con-
cluded that "[a]ccording the same core meaning to 'foreign state' in both
sections of the statute in which it occurs, we defer to the Executive Branch
for purposes of § 1332(a)(2)."45 The court also supported its contentions
with several cases dealing with recognition of foreign governments.4 6 Thus,
much written about the recognition of governments can equally apply to the
recognition of states, the seminal issue of this article.
1. Manners ofRecognition
The study of state recognition focuses on the manner in which states
are recognized and the types, or degrees, of recognition. The manner in
41 M.J. PETERSON, RECOGNITION OF GOVERNMENTs 1 (1997).
42 See id. at 2; Latvian State Cargo & Passenger S.S. Line v. McGrath, 188 F.2d 1000,
1003 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
43 See PETERSON, supra note 41, at 2. One of the main differences between governmental
and state recognition in the context of alienage jurisdiction is that, to avail oneself of alien-
age jurisdiction, only one's state need be recognized. In sovereign foreign immunities cases,
however, the state and government must be recognized before the state may access U.S.
courts. See Iran Handicraft and Carpet Export Center, 655 F. Supp. at 1277 ("There exists a
fundamental distinction between recognition of a state as an international juridical entity and
recognition of a particular government."). The jurisdiction of foreign sovereign immunities
cases is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(4): "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, ex-
clusive of interest and costs, and is between a foreign state, defined in section 1603(a) of this
title, as plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different States." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(4)
(1997). Section 1603(a) defines "foreign state:" "A 'foreign state,' except as used in section
1608 of this title, includes a political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instru-
mentality of a foreign state as defined in subsection (b)." 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (1997).
The court in Iran Handicraft and Carpet Export Center noted the distinction between
recognition of a state and recognition of a government: "It defies logic to deny that an indi-
vidual is a citizen of a foreign state solely because the state, but not is current government, is
recognized by the United States." Iran Handicraft and Export Center, 655 F. Supp. at 1279.
44 See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 92 (4th ed. 1990). It
should be noted, however, that the recognition or nonrecognition of a government is usually
more political than recognition of states. See id. at 93.
41 Matimak, 118 F.3d at 84.
46 See id. (citing Pfizer Inc. v. India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978); Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); National City Bank of N.Y. v. Republic of China, 348 U.S.
356 (1955); Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126 (1938); Jones v. United
States, 137 U.S. 202 (1890); National Petrochemical Co. v. M/T Stolt Sheaf, 860 F.2d 551
(2d Cir. 1988); Land Oberoesterreich v. Gude, 109 F.2d 635 (2d Cir. 1940)).
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which states are recognized is further divided into express and tacit, or im-
plied, recognition. Express recognition is fairly self-explanatory. In writing
about the history of the recognition of governments, M.J. Peterson describes
several methods of express recognition used in the nineteenth century.
These include: a statement from the recognizing government to the other
government expressing its recognition, a written correspondence between a
recognizing government to the receiving government addressing the head of
that government by his title and including typical diplomatic language, a
diplomat's verbal statement to the head of the receiving government, and "a
treaty provision, or a joint declaration with other governments. 47 Later, in
the twentieth century, these recognitions extended to include statements to
the media.48 These actions can be analogized to the context of recognizing
states: Certainly written and public expressions of recognition qualify as
express recognition. Any other action towards a receiving state would be
less conclusive and would therefore fall under the heading of tacit recogni-
tion.
Peterson defines tacit recognition of governments as occurring "when a
government performs an act regarding, or establishes a contact with, a new
regime that is inconsistent with nonrecognition."49 Likewise, tacit recogni-
tion of states could consist of a government acting toward another state in a
manner inconsistent with nonrecognition. The question arises as to what
types of actions should be considered inconsistent with nonrecognition.
Brownlie cites Lauterpacht as concluding that "in the case of recognition of
states, only the conclusion of a bilateral treaty which regulates comprehen-
sively the relations between the two states, the formal initiation of diplo-
matic relations, and, probably, the issue of consular exequaturs, justify the
implication [of tacit recognition]."50 Whether these specific actions are ab-
solutely required to allow the implication of tacit recognition is not essential
to this analysis; it is important to note that such action would be inconsis-
tent with a policy of nonrecognition.
2. Degrees ofRecognition
The degrees of recognition consist of de jure and de facto recognition.
The significance of this dichotomy is a bit unclear. Peterson outlines the
different interpretations of this dichotomy in the context of recognition of
governments. However, these interpretations can apply equally to the rec-
ognition of states. Between the World Wars, several interpretations of the
distinction between de jure and de facto recognition existed.51 One inter-
pretation defined de jure recognition as "irrevocable" and de facto recogni-
47 PETERSON, supra note 41, at 86-87.
41 See id. at 87.49 Id. at 87.
so BROWNLIE, supra note 44, at 96.
51 See PETERSON, supra note 41, at 94.
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tion as "revocable. 52  Another interpretation understood the distinction
between de facto and de jure recognition to merely indicate whether full or
limited diplomatic relations existed between the recognition and the re-
ceiving state.53 During the Cold War, these different interpretations were
compressed to become merely a distinction between "provisional and final
recognition." 54 However, even then, the exact meaning of the terms re-
mains unclear.
3. Implications ofRecognition
The Restatement (Third) of The Foreign Relations of the United States
notes two possible implications of recognition.55 The first is termed the
"declaratory" theory of recognition.56 Under this theory, if an entity meets
the requisites contained in § 201 of the Restatement,57 then recognition of
that entity by pre-existing states merely confirms that entity's status as a
state; it does not confer the status of "statehood" on that entity, but func-
tions solely as an acknowledgment. 58  The Restatement adopts this "de-
claratory" theory of recognition. 9
Under the "constitutive" theory of recognition, an entity must first gain
recognition from other pre-existing states before it can attain the status of a
state. 6 Although this theory seems the antithesis of the "declaratory" the-
ory of recognition, in practice the two theories are not so different. The Re-
porter's notes in the Restatement recognizes this phenomenon:
[Section 202] tends towards the declaratory view, but the practical differ-
ences between the two theories have grown smaller. Even for the declaratory
theory, whether an entity satisfies the requirements for statehood is, as a prac-
tical matter, determined by other states .... On the other hand, the constitutive
theory lost most of its significance when it was accepted that states had the ob-
52 id.
53 See id.541 d. at 96.
55 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
202 reporter's notes, cmt. 1 (1987).
56 See id.
57 These requisites are stated in the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 201 (1987):
Under international law, a state is an entity that has a defined territory and a permanent
population, under the control of its own government, and that engages in, or has the ca-
pacity to engage in, formal relations with other such entities.58 See id. § 202 cmt. a & b.
59 See id. § 202 reporter's notes cmt. 1.
(1) A state is not required to accord formal recognition to any other state but is required
to treat as a state an entity meeting the requirements of § 201, except as provided in Sub-
section (2). (2) A state has an obligation not to recognize or treat as a state an entity that
has attained the qualifications for statehood as a result of a threat or use of armed forces
in violations of the United Nations Charter.
Id. § 202. See also id. § 202 cmt. b ("Statehood not dependent on recognition").
60 See id. § 202 reporter's notes, cmt. 1.
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ligation... to treat as a state any entity having the characteristics set out in §
201.61
B. Recognition And Federal Courts
1. Types of Recognition
Explicit recognition of a state entails a formal statement from the
White House that the United States recognizes a certain entity as a state.62
For example, the White House issued a statement in 1994 recognizing Ma-
cedonia as an independent, sovereign nation.63 Similar action was taken for
61 Id. See also id. § 201.
62 See infra p. 152 and note 125.
63 See U.S. Recognizes Macedonia Over Greek Objections, WASH. PosT, Feb. 10, 1994,
at A23. Michael Ross Fowler and Julie Marie Bunck have written a thorough account of the
criteria considered when deeming states "sovereign states." MICHAEL Ross FowLER, JuLIE
MARIE BUNCK, LAW, POWER, AND THE SOVEREIGN STATE (1995). A common theme of sov-
ereign statehood is that the state maintains territory, people, and a government. See id. at 31.
However, as they note, many entities, including dependent territories, possess these requi-
sites yet are not considered "sovereign." See id. at 31-36. They therefore turn to the dichot-
omy of de jure and de facto sovereignty. See id. at 36. The former theory would consider a
state a "sovereign state" only if the state is legally or constitutionally separate from other
states. See id. at 51.
The roots of the latter theory derive from the sixteenth century writings of Jean Bodin,
which note "sovereignty has internal and external dimensions." Id. at 36 n.15. Thus, this
theory would find a state to be sovereign only if the state possessed territory, people, and a
government plus two criteria: de facto internal supremacy and de facto external independ-
ence. See generally id. at 36-50. The requirement of de facto internal supremacy deals with
a state being entirely self-governed rather than being governed from abroad; the state pos-
sesses authority over all territory and people which comprise the state. See id. at 37. Ques-
tions arise regarding the application of such a requirement however. The authors posit such
questions as "[h]ow supreme must an entity be to qualify as a sovereign?" and "[t]o what de-
gree must domestic supremacy be eroded before the international community considers re-
voking the sovereign status of a state?" Id. at 45. For example, in some states, groups of
"powerful guerrillas, terrorists, and narcotics traffickers" threaten the state's intemal su-
premacy. Id. at 41.
The second criterion of the de facto model is de facto external independence. The
authors state that "external political independence is a matter of degree, not of bright lines"
due to the interdependence of the global community and economy. Id. at 49. Thus the fol-
lowing questions arise: "To qualify as sovereign, just how independent must a territorial en-
tity be in conducting its foreign relations? Is a state still fully sovereign when authority over
vital matters is vested elsewhere, such as in a neighboring great power or perhaps in an in-
ternational tribunal or organization?" Id. at 50.
An interesting interplay exists between the de facto and de jure models. The authors il-
lustrate this interplay with the case which faced the Permanent Court of International Justice:
Lighthouses in Crete and Samos (Greece v. Fr.), 1937 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 71. See id. at
55. The case presented a conflict between France and Greece involving a contract a French
company had signed in 1913 between the Ottoman Sultan to build and maintain lighthouses
"along the coasts of the Ottoman Empire." Id. The firstjudgment in 1934 held that the con-
tract was enforceable by France against Greece. See id. at 56. In 1937, the parties returned
to the court when Greece argued that the contract could not apply to those lighthouses in
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Bosnia-Hercegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan,
Byelorussia, Armenia, and Kirghizia.64 In such circumstances, cases in-
volving citizens or subjects present no ambiguity to federal courts. The ex-
ecutive branch has recognized these countries and, therefore, citizens or
subjects from these states unequivocally meet the criteria of 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a)(2).
Crete and Samos since they were no longer a part of the Ottoman Empire when the contract
was signed. See id. The majority, considering the constitutions of Crete and Samos, used
the de jure model of state sovereignty to decide that Crete and Samos were legally and con-
stitutionally a part of the Ottoman Empire when the contract was signed. See id. The dissent
however used a de facto model to determine that Crete and Samos were not a part of the Ot-
toman Empire when the contract was signed:
If it can be said that a theoretical sovereignty remained in the Sultan after 1899, it was a
sovereignty shorn of the last vestige of power. He could neither terminate nor modify the
autonomy with which Crete had been endowed against his will and with the sanction of
the four European States. A juristic conception must not be stretched to the breaking
point, and a ghost of a hollow sovereignty cannot be permitted to obscure the realities of
the situation.
Id. at 57 (quoting Lighthouses in Crete and Samos, (Greece v. Fr.), 1937 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B)
No. 71, at 127 (Hudson, J. dissenting)).
Although the interplay between the two models is certainly critical when deciding
whether a state is truly "sovereign," the authors assert that the final decision rests with the
international community. See id. at 58. Recognition of states is indisputably a political act
and often states recognize entities within states in hopes that they will become sovereign.
See id. at 59. Other times, states refuse to recognize those states which possess the attributes
of sovereignty for political reasons, for example, the government of the state in question
supports practices repugnant to international mores. See id. The authors conclude that "ac-
ceptance may be derived from a strong showing of de facto or de jure independence, or ide-
ally both, but it is ultimately the international community that determines whether a
particular political entity qualifies as a sovereign state." Id. at 62.
The notion of the "sovereign state" has played an important role in public international
law. However, Ambassador Emilio J. Cardenas, Argentina's Permanent Representative to
the United Nations, argues that this notion is giving way to a more global community and
economy:
Governments must increasingly operate within a "global" environment, a phenomenon
which places significant restrictions on their real powers and potential actions. The "na-
tion-state" is not anymore at the centre of things. This is predominantly because its
autonomy and functions are being constantly eroded by global trends.... The shape of
the world is being rapidly changed by the joint effect of trade, capital flows, information
and communication. But also.., by a dramatic revolution arising from the international
community itself. Like the Berlin wall, walls are tumbling down everywhere. The fa-
miliar "nation-state" model seems therefore unavoidably undone. We are forced to talk
about the "obsolescence of territory" because the "nation-state" frequently appears to be
the wrong structure to cope with the world's new problems.
Emilio J. Cardenas, The Notion of Sovereignty Confronts a New Era, ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND THE LAW 13, 13-14 (Robert Pritchard ed., 1996).
64 See David Hoffman, US. Recognizes 3 Ex-Yugoslav States, WASH. POST, April 8,
1992, at A19; Don Oberdorfer, Gorbachev Resignation Ends Soviet Era; U.S. Recognizes
Russia, Other Republics; Bush Hails Change, Praises Ex-Leader, WASH. POST, Dec. 26,
1991, at Al.
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However, cases arise where the executive branch's stance regarding a
certain foreign state or its government is not explicit.65 As a result, federal
courts have acknowledged that .'[r]ecognition is not necessarily express; it
may be implied, as when a state enters into negotiations with the new state,
sends its diplomatic agents, receives such agents officially, gives exequaturs
to its consuls, forms with it conventional relations.' '' 66 This sort of analysis
results in findings of implied, or tacit, recognition by the federal courts that
the United States considered the entity in question an independent sover-
eign nation.67 The Second Circuit, addressing a 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(4)
claim of jurisdiction, employed this analysis in deciding National Petero-
chemical Co. v. MIT Stolt Sheaf.65 In that case, a corporation wholly owned
by the Iranian government brought suit in federal court at a time when the
executive branch had severed relations with the Iranian government. 69 In
determining whether it could exercise diversity jurisdiction over the corpo-
ration, the Second Circuit held that due to the need for flexibility in foreign
relations the executive branch need not be bound by formal recognition
alone.70 The opinion then turned to several acts taken by the executive
branch with respect to Iran which would indicate that some type of recog-
nition had occurred.71  The court considered various interactions between
the two countries72 and concluded:
65 For a discussion of explicit (express) and implied (tacit) recognition, see supra pp. 139-
40 and notes 47-51. Similarly, in Betancourt v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n. the court
found that a citizen of Cuba was a citizen of a foreign state although, at the time the com-
plaint was filed, Cuba was occupied by the United States. The court reached this conclusion
based on a simple statement by "the political branch of this government.., that the people
of the Island of Cuba 'are free and independent."' Betancourt v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life
Ass'n, 101 F. 305, 306 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1900). Although this pronouncement falls short of ex-
plicit recognition of Cuba as a sovereign state, the court found recognition to be implied by
this statement.
66 Republic of China v. Merchants' Fire Assur. Corp., 30 F.2d 278, 279 (9th Cir. 1929)
(citing Moore's Digest of International Law, 73).
67 For a general discussion of implied (tacit) recognition, see supra notes 50-51 and ac-
companying text. See also infra pp. 144-46 and notes 68-78 (discussing implied recognition
in American case law).
68 See National Petrochemical Co. v. M/T Stolt Sheaf, 860 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1988). See
also 28 U.S.C. 1332(a)(4), supra note 43.69 See National Petrochemical Co., 860 F.2d at 552.70 See id. at 554-55. The court also noted that the Department of State had retreated from
relying exclusively on formal recognition and therefore, federal courts should consider ob-
jective factors to decide whether tacit recognition had been granted by the executive branch.
See id. at 554.
71 See id. at 555.
72 The court stated:
Iran and the United States entered into the Algerian Accords to resolve the embassy per-
sonnel hostage crisis; an ongoing Iran-United States Claims Tribunal at the Hague con-
tinues to adjudicate disputes between the countries; and the 1955 Treaty of Amity,
Economic Relations and Consular Rights between the United States and Iran remains in
full force and effect.
Id.
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Considering these factors in the aggregate, and not in isolation, as integral
components of the United States overall relationship to Iran, the above recited
connections strongly suggest that the Executive Branch has evinced an implicit
willingness to permit the government of Iran to avail itself of a federal forum.
73
Thus, the Second Circuit found that the executive branch, through its
actions, continued to recognize Iran and its government although formal,
diplomatic ties had been severed.74
Occasionally, courts also find implicit recognition of states by applying
a test of statehood articulated by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.75 The inquiry consists of examining the rec-
ord for several uncontroversial aspects of statehood: "the power to declare
and wage war; to conclude peace; to maintain diplomatic ties with other
sovereigns; to acquire territory by discovery and occupation; and to make
international agreements and treaties."76 These articulated principles
closely correspond with conventional principles of public international
law.77 The Montevideo Convention announced factors of statehood to be
73 1d. The case was ultimately decided by an explicit request by the executive branch to
allow the corporation access to federal court. "Rather, here the Executive Branch... ex-
pressly entered this case as Amicus requesting that Iran be given access to our courts." Id.
For an analysis of such deference by a federal court to the executive branch, see infra pp.
162-64 and text accompanying notes 179-84.
74 See id. Some commentators disagree with the National Petrochemical decision:
National Petrochemical was incorrectly decided because it calls for the courts to conduct
an analysis of the executive's attitude toward a particular government. Further, many
authors agree and have criticized the Second Circuit opinion. One in particular attacked
the soundness of the judicial branch in assuming such an onerous burden of interpreting
executive actions. This type ofjudicial activism presents potential difficulties. The most
obvious is the possibility of the judiciary reaching a different conclusion than the execu-
tive intends. Another problem exists with the assumptions the court chooses to make.
The rationale used in National Petrochemical is based upon the questionable premise that
the State Department avoids the issuance of formal recognition declarations. Recent
events, however, reveal that the State Department continues to place importance upon the
issuance of these declarations. Thus, it appears that a major premise of the National Pet-
rochemical court, relied upon to rationalize their decision, may be false.
Eric T. Smith, State Recognition Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act: Who Decides,
the Judiciary or the Executive? 6 TEMP. INT'L & COMp. L.J. 169, 184 (1992) (citations
omitted).
75 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936); Morgan Guar.
Trust Co. v. Republic of Palau, 924 F.2d 1237 (2d Cir.1991) (holding that Palau was not a
foreign state).76 Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 924 F.2d at 1243 (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Ex-
port Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318-19 (1936)).
77 For example, the powers enumerated in Curtiss-Wright (to wage war, conclude peace
and enter into treaties) are indicative of autonomous government and the ability to engage in
international diplomacy, two aspects of the Montevideo Convention. However, these aspects
alone provide only guidance: Each examination is sui generis. See BROWNLIE, supra note
44, at 72. See also discussion infra note 78.
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"a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) government; and d)
capacity to enter into relations with the other states. ' 78
Hong Kong and other dependent territories could never meet the test of
statehood enumerated by the Supreme Court in Curtiss-Wright and the
Montevideo Convention. Nor could a court find that the executive branch
had established relations with these territories that were inconsistent with
nonrecognition. The essence of being a dependent territory is that there
exists a sovereign to which the dependent territory must answer. In the case
of the British Dependent Territories, Great Britain is responsible for their
78 The Montevideo Convention, Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26,
1933, art. 1, 49 Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19. Note that the requirements of the Restatement
correspond with those of the Montevideo Convention. See RESTATEMENT (TnIRD) FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 55, § 201. The requirement of a popula-
tion simply dictates that a state must encompass not only physical territory, but an "organ-
ized community" as well. BROWNLiE, supra note 44, at 73. A state must also have a defined
territory, but that territory need not always be absolute. See id. "[W]hat matters is the ef-
fective establishment of a political community. In 1913 Albania was recognized by a num-
ber of states despite a lack of settled frontiers; Israel was admitted to the United Nations
despite disputes over her borders." Id. This "political community" must be stable and must
uphold a "legal order"; an existing government is indicative of a stable political community.
See id. However, government alone is not determinative of the statehood question since, as
in the case of dependent territories, independence and sovereignty may not exist. See id.
The final aspect of statehood articulated by the Montevideo Convention is the "capacity to
enter into relations with other States," or, as Brownlie phrases it, independence: in other
words, "foreign control overbearing the decision-making of the entity concerned on a wide
range of matters of high policy and doing so systematically and on a permanent basis." Id. at
74. In the case of dependent territories, see infra note 80 and accompanying text. Brownlie
enumerates additional aspects of statehood not included in the Montevideo Convention: "A
degree of permanence," "[w]illingness to observe international law," "[a] certain degree of
civilization," "[s]overeignty," and "[flunction as a state." BROWNLIE, supra note 44, at 77-
79. A degree of permanence seems simply to be a criterion of stability. See id. at 77. How-
ever, permanence in and of itself is not an absolute requirement since at times, states have
expired after only a short lifespan. See id. The logic that a state must be willing to observe
international law is, according to Brownlie, a bit circular. See id. at 78. Only states may ob-
serve international law so to make observance of international law a prerequisite to statehood
would seemingly ask the egg to lay the chicken. See id. Nonetheless, earlier writings con-
sidered this a requirement. See id. The notion that a state must have a degree of civilization
suggests a time when Western European values and traditions were considered the bench-
mark of civilized culture. See id. This aspect of statehood has since been extracted from lit-
erature delineating aspects of statehood. See id. Sovereignty, Brownlie stresses, is the
ability of a state to "exerciseol its own legal capacities in such a way as to create rights, pow-
ers, privileges, and immunities in respect of other states." Id. The mere fact that the ability
exists is an incident of statehood; should a state choose not to do act on this ability, its status
as a state should not be affected. See id. Finally, to function as a state functions as a catch-
all for those entities which may look like a state and possess all other aspects of statehood
but which simply are not states. See id. at 79. Brownlie gives as an example the Free Terri-
tory of Treiste which was formed in 1947 by "[t]he peace treaty with Italy .... [and] was
placed under the protection of the Security Council." Id. The Free Territory of Treiste thus
had a "specialized political function ..... and a relationship with an organization which pre-
cluded it from statehood. See id.
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"defence, internal security, and foreign relation. 79 Thus according to the
standards set forth in National Petrochemical Co., the Montevideo Con-
vention and Curtiss-Wright, dependent territories can never be "states."
Furthermore, the executive branch has yet to explicitly or tacitly rec-
ognize a dependent territory; nor should such action be anticipated.80 Doing
so would undoubtedly upset those sovereigns possessed of these territories.
Such action would also violate principles of international and American
common law set forth in National Petrochemical Co., Curtiss-Wright and
the Montevideo Convention.
2. Degrees ofRecognition
The aspects of recognition comprising the dichotomy of de facto and
de jure recognition also demand discussion.81 This dichotomy reflects de-
grees of recognition, as opposed to express and tacit recognition, which ad-
dress whether the executive branch has extended recognition at all. De jure
recognition is final recognition.8 2  The court in Abu-Zeineh v. Federal
Laboratories, Inc. termed de jure recognition "formal recognition."83
De facto recognition can be analogized to a provisional recognition.
American case law addressing de facto recognition of foreign states, how-
ever, remains enigmatic. The touchstone case is Murarka v. Bachrack
79 Britain in the US.A.: Britain's Dependent Territories, supra note 8.80 There has been no exchange of diplomats between the United States and dependent ter-
ritories. See The World Factbook 1997, supra note 8.81 See supra pp. 140-41 and notes 5 1-54.
82 see id.
83 See Abu-Zeineh v. Federal Lab., Inc., 975 F. Supp. 774, 776 (W.D. Pa. 1994). Courts
sometimes seem to equate dejure recognition with explicit recognition and de facto recogni-
tion with implicit or tacit recognition. See id. It is important to distinguish these terms how-
ever. Explicit and tacit recognition address whether the executive branch has recognized an
entity; de jure and de facto recognition deal with whether the recognition bestowed upon an
entity is final or merely provisional. The court in Abu-Zeineh stated that "the foreign state
must be recognized by the Executive Branch of the United States government.... The rec-
ognition may be de jure or de facto." Id. From the language, it appears that the court is ex-
plaining one of two possible scenarios. First, it could be saying that a state must be
recognized and that recognition may be final (dejure) or provisional (de facto). On the other
hand, if the court is equating de jure recognition with explicit recognition and de facto rec-
ognition with tacit recognition, then the court could be saying that a state must be recognized
either explicitly or tacitly. However, from the clear meaning of the language used, the for-
mer scenario seems more plausible. A state must be recognized. Once a state is recognized,
the explicit/implicit dichotomy becomes moot. The state is simply recognized. However,
that recognition may be final (dejure) or provisional (de facto). This is what the court seems
to state when it says that the recognition may be either de jure or de facto. However, the
opinion becomes more confusing when the court considers de facto recognition: "[de facto]
recognition can be accorded a foreign state based upon an objective examination of the rela-
tions between the recognized entity and the recognizing state." Id. For purposes of this arti-
cle, implicit/explicit recognition and de jure/de facto recognition will be separate events, the
former establishing recognition and the latter serving as a degree of recognition.
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Bros.84 Murarka dealt with a breach of contract action brought by an Indian
corporation against a New York corporation.85 The case was filed on July
14, 1947 and later amended on January 14, 1953.86 On July 18, 1947, Great
Britain passed the Indian Independence Act and on August 15, 1947, India
became a "self-governing member of the British Commonwealth of Na-
tions. 's On that date, the United States formally recognized India as a for-
eign state.88 The court held that the date of the filing of the amended
complaint should control:
[I]n view of the fact that the dismissal of the original complaint was "without
prejudice," rather than "with leave to amend," we would in any event be dis-
posed to treat the amendment as in effect the filing of a supplemental com-
plaint on January 14, 1953, at which time India was unquestionably an
independent foreign power fully recognized by the United States. 9
The importance of the case is its dicta, wherein the court stated that
even had the original date of filing controlled, the court could have found de
facto recognition of India.90 The exchange of ambassadors between the
United States and India in February and April 1947 sufficed to show de
facto recognition of India by the executive branch.1 "To all intents and
purposes, these acts constituted a full recognition of the Interim Govern-
ment of India at a time when India's ties with Great Britain were in the pro-
cess of withering away .... Thus, it appears that the imminence of
Indian recognition would have allowed the court to find that a type of "pro-
visional" recognition had already occurred thereby permitting Indian citi-
zens to successfully invoke alienage jurisdiction. Therefore, one might
propose that in American common law, the definition of de facto recogni-
tion of states seems to indicate a "provisional" type of recognition to be ap-
plied when formal recognition is "imminent."
A further example of de facto recognition is presented in Bank of Ha-
waii v. Balos in which the court had to decide whether residents of the Mar-
shall Islands were citizens of a foreign state under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2).93
The defendants argued that the court lacked subject matter over the plain-
tiff.94 The plaintiff was a resident of the Marshall Islands which, at the time
of the suit, remained subject to a Trusteeship Agreement governing U.S.
84 See Murarka v. Bachrack Bros., Inc., 215 F.2d 547 (2d Cir. 1954).
85 See id. at 549-50.
16 See id. at 550.
97 Id. at 551.
88 See id. at 552.
89 d.
90 See id. at 552.
91 See id.
92 id.
93 Bank of Hawaii v. Balos, 701 F. Supp. 744 (D. Haw. 1988).
94 See id. at 744-45.
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territories in the Pacific.95 The defendant supported its argument with
World Communications Corp. v. Micronesian Telecomm. Corp. which in-
volved an alienage diversity action wherein "the defendant was a citizen of
the Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands. 96 The World Communications
court held that alienage diversity did not exist.97
The Bank of Hawaii court, however, held that the Marshall Islands was
a "foreign state" for purposes of the alienage diversity statute.98 It sup-
ported its decision with the Murarka case99 and then-recent developments
between the United States and the Marshall Islands, namely that the Com-
pact of Free Association Act of 1985 had been approved by both the Mar-
shall Islands and the United States.'0° The court concluded:
In the present case, highly significant changes have occurred with respect
to the relationship between the United States and the RMI [Marshall Islands].
Both the Congress and the President have indicated that the RMI is henceforth
to be treated as an independent sovereign. The fact that the Trust Agreement
- in form - may technically yet be in effect does not alter the substantive
change in the status of the RMI.Y"
The court stressed the "substance over form" test of Murarka, in es-
sence holding that although the Marshall Islands could not technically be a
sovereign state under the circumstances, recognition by the United States
was imminent.
10 2
Applying this standard to dependent territories again reveals that those
territories have not received de facto recognition from the executive branch.
Although some dependent territories have become independent states,0 3 in-
dependence for the remaining independent territories is not imminent. Un-
der the "imminent" standard of Murarka, a dependent territory cannot be
considered a "foreign state" as the term applies to de facto recognition.
104
95 See id. at 745-46.
96 Id. at 745 (citing World Communications Corp. v. Micronesian Telecomm. Corp., 456
F. Supp. 1122 (D. Haw. 1978)).
97 See id.
98 See id. at 747.
99 See id. at 746-47.
1oo Id. at 746. The Compact provided that the Marshall Islands entered into a "free asso-
ciation" with the United States. See id.
01 Id. at 747.
102 See id.
103 For example, the Bahamas gained its independent status on July 10, 1973. See The
World Factbook 1997, supra note 8.
104 When distinguishing the situation presented in Murarka from that of Matimak, the
Second Circuit emphasized that the impending independence of India was vital to the court
finding de facto recognition. This distinction would prove critical to the Matimak opinion.
When the case was filed, Hong Kong was a dependent territory and independence was not
"imminent." The court thereby held that Hong Kong had not received de facto recognition.
See Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily, 118 F.3d 76, 80 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
883 (1998).
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As discussed above, a dependent territory cannot be considered a "for-
eign state" as the term applies in international and American common law.
Therefore, a dependent territory cannot be considered a "foreign state" un-
der the Alienage Diversity statute as interpreted by the federal courts °5
This leads us to the unfortunate conclusion that federal courts cannot exer-
cise jurisdiction over litigants who are citizens of dependent territories; they
are not, nor could ever hope to be, citizens of a recognized foreign state.
This conclusion however is unsatisfactory considering the role that many
corporate "citizens" of dependent territories play in the United States and
global economy.10 6 The realization of this conclusion will be helpful when
considering the Matimak and Wilson cases. The next section introduces
these cases and analyzes their respective rationales.
IV. MATIMAK TRADING CO. V. KHALILY AND WILSON V. HUMPHREYS
(CAYMAN) LIMITED
A. Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily
1. Matimakln The District Court
Matimak Trading Company sued Albert Khalily d/b/a Unitex Mills,
Inc. (Khalily) and D.A.Y. Kids Sportswear Inc. (D.A.Y.) for breach of con-
tract in the Southern District of New York.10 7 A default judgment was en-
tered against defendant D.A.Y10 8 The court sua sponte directed the parties
"to make brief submissions concerning the issue of subject matter jurisdic-
tion." 0 9 The issue of subject matter jurisdiction arose because Matimak is a
105 As discussed supra note 10, the Wilson opinion is vague as to which "foreign state"
the Cayman Islands corporation should be considered a citizen: the Cayman Islands or Great
Britain. If the opinion asserts that the Cayman Islands corporation should be considered a
citizen of Great Britain, then the holding is supportable since Great Britain is a "foreign
state" under American and international law. If, on the other hand, the opinion asserts that
the Cayman Islands corporation should be considered a citizen of the Cayman Islands, the
holding is unsupportable since the Cayman Islands cannot satisfy the criteria of a "foreign
state" as demanded by American and international law.
106 See supra notes 8, 12 and accompanying text; infra note 157. In addition, the decision
in Matimak makes undesirable actors parties to suits more frequently. Already as a result of
Matimak, dependent territories' corporations have tried to fraudulently assign their claims to
parties able to access the federal courts. See generally Shamis v. Ambassador Factors Corp.,
No. 95 Civ. 9818, 1997 WL 473577 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (dismissed due to a fraudulent assign-
ment of claims by a Hong Kong corporation).
107 See Matimak, 118 F.3d at 78.
108 See Matimak Trading Co. Ltd. v. Khalily, 936 F. Supp. 151, 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1996),
aff'd 118 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied 118 S. Ct. 883 (1998). There was no mention
of Khalily in the district court's opinion. Whether a default judgment was entered against
Khalily as well is unknown, however Judge Wood dismissed the entire case without preju-
dice to state court. See id. at 152.
19 Id.
Lost In The Judicial Wilderness
19:130 (1998)
Hong Kong corporation incorporated under Hong Kong law with its princi-
pal place of business in Wanchai, Hong Kong. ° Unless Matimak could
prove that it was a citizen of a "foreign state" as defined in the alienage di-
versity statute, the district court could not exercise jurisdiction over the
case. Matimak argued that it should be considered a "de facto foreign state"
for purposes of the alienage diversity statute 28 § 1332(a)(2).'1 ' It pre-
sented a letter from the State Department's Assistant Legal Adviser Jim
Hergen that supported recognition of Hong Kong as a de facto foreign state
for purposes of alienage jurisdiction.!12 Matimak also cited Murarka v.
Bachrack Bros., in which the Second Circuit held that India was a de facto
foreign state because when the complaint was filed, India was "substan-
tial[ly]" a foreign state. 1 3 The district court found the case to be inapposite
since, to date, the United States has not taken any of the steps it took with
India to recognize Hong Kong as a foreign state.
14
Matimak further buttressed its argument with several cases, two of
which the district court named: Netherlands Shipmortgage Corp. v. Mdadias
and Wilson v. Humphreys (Cayman) Ltd.11 5 In the former case, the Second
Circuit found that diversity jurisdiction existed over a Bermudian corpora-
tion.1 6 The district court in Matimak was not convinced: "there is no evi-
o10 See id.
"I Id.
112 See id. This stance was later disclaimed by the Justice Department on behalf of the
State Department in an amicus brief to the Second Circuit: "'[the State Department no
longer urges treatment of Hong Kong as a de facto foreign state and withdraws any reliance
on this contention."' Matimak, 118 F.3d at 82. The Second Circuit criticized the Justice
Department for placing this disclaimer in a footnote. "The Justice Department chose to in-
form the Court of this crucial fact in a footnote. This Court frowns on raising such important
points in footnotes, either before the district court or on appeal." Id. at 82 n. 1.
"
3 See Matimak, 936 F. Supp. at 152; Murarka, 215 F.2d at 547.
"
4 See Matimak, 936 F. Supp. at 152.
At the time the complaint was filed in the Murarka case, only four days before the Indian
Independence Act took effect, an Interim Indian Government had already been estab-
lished in anticipation of the political separation of India from Great Britain. The United
States had already taken steps to recognize India as an independent nation with the re-
ception of India's first ambassador and the accreditation of the first United States Ambas-
sador to India .... [T]he official recognition of India as a foreign state was imminent....
Id. Note that this accords with the notion that, in United States federal courts, de facto rec-
ognition is considered a provisional type of recognition.
.. See id. at 153.
116 Bermuda is a British Dependent Territory. See Britain in the U.S.A.: Britain's De-
pendent Territories, supra note 8. The plaintiff in Netherlands Shipmortgage Corp. (Neth-
erlands) was a Bermudian corporation, with its principal place of business in Bermuda. See
Netherlands Shipmortgage Corp., Ltd. v. Madias, 717 F.2d 731, 735 (2d Cir. 1983). Neth-
erlands sued various New York defendants who were guarantors of a Netherlands loan. See
id. at 732. The Second Circuit, addressing the issue of diversity jurisdiction stated, "[T]here
is no question that diversity jurisdiction exists. [Netherlands] is a Bermuda corporation with
its principal place of business in Bermuda. The individual defendants are citizens and resi-
dents of New York while the defendant partnership is organized and exists under the laws of
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dence in the record that subject matter jurisdiction in that case was ever
raised at the district or appellate level."' l17 In Wilson, the Seventh Circuit
held that a Cayman Islands corporation satisfied the requirements of the al-
ienage diversity statute. 18 The district court in Matimak countered, "the
reasoning behind that decision.., is based primarily on policy arguments
that are unavailing given the fact that the judicial branch has no power to
recognize foreign states."' 19  The district court, remaining unpersuaded,
dismissed the case without prejudice.120
2. Matimak in the Second Circuit
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's holding and went a
step further: It not only found that alienage diversity jurisdiction did not
exist over Matimak, but further, that Matimak was stateless for purposes of
the alienage diversity statute.12' The court came to this conclusion after
considering "(1) whether Hong Kong is a 'foreign state,' such that Matimak
is a 'citizen or subject' of a 'foreign state'; (2) whether Matimak is a 'citi-
zen or subject' of the United Kingdom, by virtue of Hong Kong's relation-
ship with the United Kingdom when it brought suit; and (3) whether any
and all noncitizens may ipso facto invoke alienage jurisdiction against a
United States citizen.' 22 The court answered each negatively. 123
To answer the first inquiry, the Second Circuit began with the general
rule to which federal courts adhere: a "foreign state" is usually defined as
one recognized by the executive branch. 124 Courts defer to executive rec-
ognition when deciding whether a nation is a "foreign state.' 25 The United
States has never explicitly recognized Hong Kong as a foreign state. 26
Therefore, the court turned to the issue of whether Hong Kong had received
New York and has its principal place of business in New York. Accordingly, the statutory
and constitutional requirements of diversity jurisdiction are satisfied." Id. at 735.
117 Matimak, 936 F. Supp. at 153; Netherlands Shipmortgage Corp., 717 F.2d 731, 735
(2d Cir. 1983).118 See Wilson v. Humphreys (Cayman) Ltd., 916 F.2d 1239, 1243 (7th Cir. 1990) cert.
denied, 499 U.S. 947 (1991).
"9 Matimak, 936 F. Supp. at 153.
120 id.
121 See Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily, 118 F.3d 76, 88 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118
S. Ct. 883 (1998). For a discussion of statelessness, see supra Part II.A and text accompa-
nying notes 13-23.
22 See Matimak, 118 F.3d at 79.
123 Id. at 88.
124 Id. at 79 (citing C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 3604 (1984)).
125 McDOUGAL ET AL, supra note 3; see, e.g., Land Oberoesterreich v. Gude, 109 F.2d
635, 637 (2d Cir. 1940). See also Matimak, 118 F.3d at 79-80 (citing C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER
& E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3604 (1984)).
126 Matimak, 118 F.3d at 80.
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"de facto recognition" by the executive branch.12 7 Since the status of de
facto recognition depends on whether "the Executive Branch regards the
entity as an 'independent sovereign nation,' '12 8 the court determined that
there could never be de facto recognition of Hong Kong.129 At the time of
the suit, Hong Kong was a dependent territory of Great Britain and there-
fore, Hong Kong could not be considered an "independent sovereign na-
tion." 30 As a result, Matimak could not "invoke alienage jurisdiction as a
'citizen or subject' of Hong Kong since Hong Kong is not a 'foreign state'
as contemplated by 28 U.S.C. § 1332." ''
As for the second inquiry, the court held that Matimak could not in-
voke alienage jurisdiction as a "citizen or subject" of the United Kingdom.
Since foreign states alone dictate who their citizens are, 32 the court began
by delving into the British Nationality Act of 1981, the cornerstone of Brit-
ish nationality law. 33 The court noted that "the Act applies only to natural
persons, not corporations" 134 and does not automatically confer United
Kingdom citizenship on citizens of British Dependent Territories.13S Thus,
127 See generally Murarka v. Bachrack Bros., 215 F.2d 547, 550-53 (2d Cir. 1954) (find-
ing alienage jurisdiction over an Indian corporation thirty days before the United States rec-
ognized India). For a further discussion of Murarka see supra pp. 147-48 and notes 84-92.
'
28Matimak, 118 F.3d at 80.
29 Matimak, 118 F.3d at 82.
130 The court supported this conclusion with the British Nationality Act 1981, the British
Companies Act 1948, the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992, and an amicus brief
from the Justice Department which stated that the United States did not "urgel] the treatment
of Hong Kong as a de facto foreign state." Id. The British Nationality Act, according to the
court, "applies only to natural persons, not corporations." Id at 85-86 (citing the British Na-
tionality Act 1981 § 4(l)(2)). The British Companies Act 1948 states that "'the privileges of
British nationality are not conferred on corporations under the laws of Hong Kong."' Id.
(quoting Windert Watch Co. v. Remex Elecs. Ltd., 468 F.Supp. 1242, 1246 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(citing the British Companies Act 1948 § 406)). The United States-Hong Kong Policy Act
recognized Congress' desire to maintain relations with Hong Kong once China regained sov-
ereignty. It states that Hong Kong will retain "a high degree of autonomy on all matters
other than defense and foreign affairs." 28 U.S.C. § 5701 (1997). In addition, prior to the
transition of control from Great Britain to China the United States would "continue to treat
Hong Kong as a territory which is fully autonomous from the United Kingdom" with regard
to "economic and trade matters." 28 U.S.C. § 5713 (1997).
131 Matimak, 118 F.3d at 82.
132 Id. at 85 (citing United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 668 (1898) ("Nor can
it be doubted that it is the inherent right of every independent nation to determine for itself,




135 The Justice Department, as amicus curiae, argued that Hong Kong corporations are
"citizens or subjects" of the United Kingdom by virtue of being "governed by the Hong
Kong Companies Ordinance, modeled on the British Companies Act 1948." Id. at 86. Be-
cause Matimak ultimately must answer to the British Crown, it should be treated as a "citi-
zen or subject" of the United Kingdom. The court rejected this argument stating that "[t]he
fact that the Hong Kong Companies Ordinance may be 'ultimately traceable to the British
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the court concluded that Matimak was stateless because it was neither a
citizen of a recognized foreign state nor a citizen of the United Kingdom.
Because it was stateless, Matimak could not invoke alienage jurisdiction. 1 6
The court then turned to whether noncitizens of the United States may
"ipso facto" take advantage of U.S. federal courts under alienage jurisdic-
tion. 137 The answer was no.13' Alienage jurisdiction performs two func-
tions. First, it provides a neutral forum for foreigners; secondly, it avoids
adverse international encounters between the United States and a foreign
country. 139 According to the court, allowing "stateless" persons access to
federal courts under alienage jurisdiction
does not serve [the rationale for alienage jurisdiction]: there is no danger of
foreign entanglements, as there is no sovereign with whom the United State
[sic] could be [sic] become entangled .... If a foreign state has determined
that a person is not entitled to citizenship it should certainly be unconcerned
with that person's treatment in a court in the United States.
140
Thus, the court ends its endeavor that, as the dissent points out, effectively
denies the benefits of alienage jurisdiction to corporations formed under the
laws of British Dependent Territories. 141 The status of corporations incor-
porated under the laws of other dependent territories remains unclear.
Crown is too attenuated a connection. Matimak was incorporated under Hong Kong law, the
Companies Ordinance 1984 of Hong Kong, and is entitled to the protections of Hong Kong
law only." Id.
136 See id. at 88.
137 Id. at 79.
i'38 See id. at 86.
139 Id. at 82-83. Kevin Johnson states that, when discussing the policies underlying alien-
age jurisdiction, "[c]ourts state rather blandly, in ahistoric fashion, the basic reasons for al-
ienage jurisdiction - to protect foreign citizens and to avoid foreign entanglements." See
Johnson, supra note 21, at 31. He proposes that the main policy of alienage jurisdiction is to
minimize the risk of bias that foreign litigants may encounter in the United States, namely, in
state courts. See id. at 33. In particular, he argues that foreign corporations are particularly
susceptible to these biases. See id.
140 Matimak, 118 F.3d at 87.
141 Id. at 88 (Altimari, C.J., dissenting). The dissent's argument was grounded in the no-
tion of "'substance' over 'form:' Clearly Matimak exists and, in the dissent's view, it
seemed unnecessarily technical to argue that Matimak should be stateless simply because it
is not a British corporation. Id. at 91. "Is it thus so easy to disavow a person or a corporate
entity?" Id. at 89. The dissent noted that the Department of Justice explicitly requested that
the court exercise jurisdiction over Matimak and that Congress "recognizes Hong Kong as a
separate foreign state for the purposes of per-country numerical limitations under Section
202 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act."
Hong Kong is: recognized as an autonomous entity in the economic and trade arena; a
contracting party to the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade, and thereby accorded
most favored nation status by the United States; considered a member country in the
United States Information Agency educational exchange program; and a member of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Hong Kong is a founding
member of the World Trade Organization and strongly supports an open multilateral
trading system and is a member in its own right in several multilateral economic organi-
zations including the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation and the Asian Development
Bank.... Hong Kong has acceded to the Paris Convention on industrial property, the
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B. Wilson v. Humphreys (Cayman) Limited
1. Wilson in the Seventh Circuit
The plaintiffs in Wilson were a husband and wife who vacationed in
the Cayman Islands at Humphreys' hotel. There, Mrs. Wilson was "as-
saulted by an intruder entering her second floor hotel room through a bal-
cony door while she was asleep. The intruder attempted to rob and rape
Mrs. Wilson, and she suffered bodily injuries during the attack." 142 The
Wilsons sued the hotel for damages incurred by Mrs. Wilson. Humphreys
moved to dismiss the complaint due to, inter alia, lack of subject matter ju-
risdiction. The hotel argued that, because it was a Cayman Islands corpo-
ration, 143 alienage diversity jurisdiction was not satisfied. The Seventh
Circuit, however, held that a corporation incorporated under the laws of the
Cayman Islands was a citizen of a foreign state.' 44 It cited the British Na-
tionality Act 1981: "A citizen of a British Dependent Territory is a 'citizen
of the United Kingdom and Colonies."",145 Then, it considered other cases
decided by federal courts that, although "generally without discussion,' 46
found subject matter jurisdiction to exist when Cayman Islands corporations
were parties. 147 It concluded by stating, "We see no reason to depart from
Berne copyright convention , and the Geneva and Paris Universal Copyright Conven-
tions.
Id. at 90 (citing the Immigration and Naturalization Act H.R.Rep. No. 101-723(1) § 202 at
196 (1990); 22 U.S.C. § 5701 (1997); 22 U.S.C. § 5712(3) (1997); H.R.Rep. No. 128),
104' Cong. § 2403 (1995); DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 1995 and 1996 COUNTRY REPORTS ON
ECONOMIC POLICY AND TRADE PRACTICES (HONG KONG)). The dissent concludes that "Hong
Kong is a unique and critical component in the scheme of international policies and global
economic expansion. Access to our federal courts is justified without exceeding the bounda-
ries ofjudicial authority." Id. at 92.
142 Wilson v. American Trans Air, Inc., 874 F.2d 386, 387 (7th Cir. 1989).
143 The Cayman Islands is a British Dependent Territory. See Britain in the US.A.: Brit-
ain's Dependent Territories, supra note 8.
'44 See Wilson v. Humphreys (Cayman) Ltd., 916 F.2d 1239, 1242 (7th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 499 U.S. 947 (1991). For a discussion of recognition theory, see supra Part III.A.1-
2, notes 41-54 and accompanying text.
145 Wilson, 916 F.2d at 1242 (citing the British Nationality Act 1981 § 51(3)(a)(ii)).
146 Id. Hong Kong corporations, and indeed other corporations formed under the laws of
dependent territories, have historically enjoyed the perceived neutrality of federal courts.
See generally Nowak v. Tak How Investments, Ltd. 94 F.3d 708 (1st Cir. 1996) (exercising
alienage diversity jurisdiction over a Hong Kong company); Neely v. Club Med Manage-
ment Services, Inc., 63 F.3d 166, 180 n. 9 (3d Cir. 1994) (jurisdiction based on maritime ju-
risdiction but in dicta explaining that alienage diversity jurisdiction could have been
exercised over a Cayman Islands corporation); Lehman v. Humphrey Cayman, Ltd., 713
F.2d 339 (8th Cir. 1983) (exercising jurisdiction over a Cayman Islands corporation).
147 See id. (citing Bally Export Corp. v. Balicar, Ltd., 804 F.2d 398, 399-400 (7th Cir.
1986); Philan Ins. Ltd. v. Frank B. Hall & Co., Inc., 712 F. Supp. 339, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1989);
Rolls Royce (Canada) Ltd. v. Cayman Airways, Ltd., 617 F. Supp. 17, 18 (S.D. Fla 1985)).
But see Windert Watch Co., Inc. v. Remex Electronics Ltd., 468 F. Supp. 1242 (S.D.N.Y.
1979) (holding that alienage jurisdiction did not exist over two Hong Kong corporations).
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the weight of authority. Certainly, the exercise of American judicial
authority over the citizens of a British Dependent Territory implicates this
country's relationship with the United Kingdom - precisely the raison
d'8tre for applying alienage jurisdiction. 148
This statement cannot be denied. The strange assertion by the Mati-
mak court that "no danger of foreign entanglements [exists], as there is no
sovereign with whom the United State [sic] could be [sic] become entan-
gled" 4 is bewildering. In the case of British Dependent Territories, there
is a foreign sovereign with whom the United States may become entangled:
Great Britain. Refusing to allow these corporations access to federal court
could easily be construed by the British as adverse to their interests. In the
past, Great Britain has reacted when it perceived that the United States de-
nied its citizens judicial protections.' 0 Repercussions of this decision
might involve making access to British courts difficult for U.S. corporations
or, more specifically, making access more difficult for U.S. corporations in-
corporated under the laws of United States' dependencies.'
Another consideration is that many British Dependent Territories
(along with dependent territories of other nations'52) are tax havens. 53
Corporations frequently incorporate under the laws of dependent territories
to enjoy their beneficial tax schemes. 54 The notion that these multinational
corporations are "stateless" in the eyes of United States federal courts is un-
appealing since statelessness implicates more than lack of access to federal
courts.
A broad holding that corporations incorporated under the laws of a de-
pendent territory are stateless could affect the substantive legal rights of
these corporations in the United States. Under international law, there is no
obligation, save a moral one, to treat the stateless entity in a nondiscrimi-
natory manner. 55 Discrimination against foreign business has been and re-
mains an underlying reason for alienage jurisdiction. An authoritative
decision by a federal court of appeals holding that these corporations are
stateless, and therefore not entitled to legal protections, could encourage
141 Wilson, 916 F.2d at 1243.
149 Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily, 118 F.3d 76, 87 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.
Ct. 883 (1998).
150 Neuhaus, supra note 12, at 1098.
151 The United States' dependencies are American Samoa, Baker Island, Guam, Howland
Island, Jarvis Island, Johnston Atoll, Kingman Reef, Midway Islands, Navassa Island,
Northern Mariana Islands, Palmyra Atoll, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, and Wake Island. See
The World Facibook 1997 supra note 8.
152 See generally GRUNDY, supra note 8.
153 See id.
4 See id.
155 See McDouGAL ET AL, supra note 3 at 921 ("statelessness means 'the loss of a com-
munity willing and able to guarantee any rights whatsoever."') (quoting H. ARENDT, THE
ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM at 257 (1958)).
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discriminatory legislation aimed at corporations from dependent territories.
This possibility could discourage incorporation in these dependent territo-
ries, causing devastating effects on their economies. 156 In addition, corpo-
rations already incorporated in these territories could see their substantive
legal rights in the United States disappear thus discouraging those compa-
nies already so situated from doing business in the United States. 157 The
need for a resolution of this conflict is necessary to allow these corporations
a modicum of predictability, especially when this predictability is intermin-
gled with the economic stability of the dependent territories.
V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS To THE MATiMAK DILEMMA
Each of the following suggestions rests the solution to the Matimak
problem with one of our three branches of government. The first solution
rests with the judiciary, the second with the executive branch, the third with
Congress. The first option would require the judiciary to interpret foreign
nations' nationality laws to determine whether citizens of those nations' de-
pendent territories are citizens of the foreign nation or as citizens of the de-
pendent territory. Should the former be decided, then the federal court
could exercise alienage jurisdiction over the litigant. Otherwise, federal
courts could not exercise alienage jurisdiction over the litigant since de-
pendent territories cannot be considered "recognized" foreign states; de-
pendent territories by definition are not independent sovereign nations. As
described above, an executive recognition of a dependent territory would
not comport with United States common law as articulated by the Supreme
Court in Curtiss-Wright and international law as described by the Montevi-
deo Convention.
158
The second resolution rests with the executive branch. This option
would require that federal courts defer to executive requests regarding over
which foreign litigants they may exercise jurisdiction. For example, in the
Matimak case, the State Department issued an amicus brief requesting that
156 These corporations make up much of dependent territories' economies. For example,
Anguilla is home to more than 5,000 registered companies. See GRUNDY, supra note 8, at 7.
As for Bermuda, "[a]pproximately 8,500 international businesses are registered in Bermuda.
These employ approximately 2,000 people and contribute to approximately 26% of the Is-
land's gross domestic product. Taking into account all secondary effects, international busi-
ness provides approximately 50% of Bermuda's economic activity." Investment in Bermuda
(visited January 17, 1998) <http://www.kpmg.bm/investme.htm>. The Cayman Islands is a
major offshore financial center. See The World Factbook 1997, supra note 8. Incorpora-
tions fees are a significant source of revenue in the British Virgin Islands. See id.
157 This would be an unfortunate result since the U.S. is a significant trading partner with
many of these territories. In 1995 Hong Kong exports to the United States reached $37.9
billion. United States exports to Hong Kong reached $14.9 billion. See CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC STATISTIcs No. PrEx
3.10/7-5 158 T.120 (1996). In 1993, Netherlands Antilles exports reached $1.3 billion, 39%
of which went to the United States. See The World Factbook 1997, supra note 8.
"' See supra Part C. 1.
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the court exercise jurisdiction over the Hong Kong corporation. 159  Al-
though the Second Circuit declined this request, under this option, courts
would instead allow the executive branch, the branch best equipped to deal
with international issues, to decide which noncitizens of the United States
should be entitled to enter U.S. federal courts. In this manner, the judiciary
could refrain from making decisions regarding international affairs that
could contradict executive policy.
The final option would require that Congress amend the current diver-
sity statute to define (a) what a foreign state is and (b) over which entities
from foreign states federal courts may exercise jurisdiction. This option
would first require that the outer limits of federal court alienage jurisdiction
set by the Constitution be deciphered. If the Constitution allows the courts
alienage jurisdiction over any noncitizen of the United States, then the cur-
rent alienage diversity statute compresses this jurisdiction to include juris-
diction over only those citizens of recognized foreign states. It would be
constitutional for Congress to amend the diversity statute to allow alienage
jurisdiction over any noncitizen of the United States. However, should the
Constitution sanction suits involving only citizens of recognized foreign
states, then the diversity statute as it stands stretches the federal courts' di-
versity jurisdiction as far as it can constitutionally reach. Therefore, one
might surmise that only a constitutional amendment would allow Congress
to change the diversity statute to allow the federal courts alienage jurisdic-
tion over any noncitizen. 16°
With each of these options come positive and negative aspects. The
third solution, an amendment to the diversity statute, appears the most
promising. This section first considers the other alternatives and explains
why they are less satisfactory than the third.
A. The First Solution
The first option embraces the paths taken by the courts in both Mati-
mak and Wilson. Both courts turned to Great Britain's nationality law to
decide whether the dependent territory corporate litigant was a citizen of a
recognized foreign state. Unfortunately, learning the intricacies of a foreign
nation's nationality laws can lead to divergent opinions, as the Matimak and
159 The Second Circuit did not yield to this request because Hong Kong is not a recog-
nized foreign state, nor could it ever be recognized as one. Thus, to exercise jurisdiction
over the Hong Kong corporation would extend the court's jurisdictional boundaries past
those set by Congress in the diversity statute 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2). See Matimak Trading
Co. v. Khalily, 118 F.3d 76, 86 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 883 (1998).
160 Even if this is the situation, it could be argued that Congress could invoke its powers
derived from the "necessary and proper" clause of the Constitution and thereby amend the
alienage diversity statute. Such action would be justified since it would allow the federal
courts to operate more efficiently by avoiding questions of other countries' nationality laws.
See WRIGHT, supra note 33, at 31 (discussing the American Law Institute's proposal that
Congress "set[ ] a time limit for raising jurisdictional questions").
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Wilson cases demonstrate. In Matimak, the court found that "the British
Nationality Act clearly distinguishes between citizens of the United King-
dom and citizens of 'British Dependent Territories' ' '161 while the Wilson
court found that "[a] citizen of a British Dependent Territory is a 'citizen of
the United Kingdom and Colonies'." 162 Both courts cited the British Na-
tionality Act 1981.163
This curious result is most likely due to two reasons. First, the courts
reviewed Britain's complicated nationality law, which requires not just an
in depth study of the law as it presently stands, but also a study of the his-
tory and evolution of Britain's nationality laws.164 This article does not
seek to be a primer on the British Nationality Act 1981, but perhaps one as-
sumption about the Act may be made. Despite the intricacies of British na-
tionality law, 165 it seems unlikely that any sovereign possessed of dependent
territories would favor the idea of United States federal courts considering
the citizens of that dependent territory stateless.166
The results of Matimak and Wilson suggest that federal courts will ar-
rive at discordant opinions when faced with other countries' nationality
laws. While this result may not always be objectionable, 167 it seems that in
161 Matimak, 118 F.3d at 86 (citing British Nationality Act 1981 § 4(l)(2)).
162 Wilson v. Humphreys (Cayman) Ltd., 916 F.2d 1239, 1242 (7th Cir. 1990) (citing
British Nationality Act 1981 § 5 1(3)(a)(ii)), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 947 (1991).
161 The section of the British Nationality Act 1981 cited by the court in Matimak states:
(1) This section applies to any person who is a British Dependent Territories citizen, a
British Overseas citizen, a British subject under this Act or a British protected person.(2) A person to whom this section applies shall be entitled, on an application for his reg-
istration as a British citizen, to be registered as such a citizen if the following require-
ments are satisfied in the case of that person, namely - (a) subject to subsection (3), that
he was in the United Kingdom at the beginning of the period of five years ending with
the date of the application and that the number of days on which he was absent from the
United Kingdom in that period does not exceed 450; and (b) that the number of days on
which he was absent from the United Kingdom in the period of twelve months so ending
does not exceed 90; and (c) that he was not at any time in the period of twelve months so
ending subject under the immigration laws to any restriction on the period for which he
might remain in the United Kingdom; and (d) that he was not at any time in the period of
five years so ending in the United Kingdom in breach of the immigration laws.
British Nationality Act 1981 § 4(l)(2). The section of the British Nationality Act 1981 cited
by the court in Wilson states, "(3) In any enactment or instrument whatever passed or made
before commencement. .. (a) 'citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies' ... (ii) in rela-
tion to any time after commencement, means a person who under this Act is a British citizen,
a British Dependent Territories citizen or a British Overseas citizen." British Nationality Act
1981 § 51(3)(a)(ii).
164 See IAN A. MACDONALD & NICHOLAS BLAKE, THE NEW NATIONALITY LAW 5 (1982).
165 For example, the Second Circuit noted that British Dependent Territories' citizens
"must first undergo a citizenship application procedure and fulfill certain application proce-
dure and fulfill certain residency requirements in the United Kingdom proper before earning
British citizenship." Matimak, 118 F.3d at 86 (citing British Nationality Act 1981 § 4(l)(2)).
166 See discussion of statelessness, supra Part II.A, notes 13-23 and accompanying text.
167 Judges and commentators agree that the increasing case load burdening the courts of
appeals invites intercircuit conflict. See generally J. Clifford Wallace, The Nature and Ex-
tent of Intercircuit Conflicts: A Solution Needed for a Mountain or a Molehill?, 71 CAL. L.
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the realm of alienage jurisdiction, a sense of uniformity would be beneficial
to potential litigants, foreign nations, dependent territories, and the United
States. Potential litigants would be able to save time and money if they
knew, before commencement of a suit, whether standing in a federal court
would be attainable. With respect to foreign nations and the United States,
uniform treatment of similarly situated corporations encourages the impres-
sion of just treatment in U.S. federal courts. Should that impression be
damaged by decisions such as Matimak, foreign governments may choose
to react: As before stated, Great Britain has been known to "claw back" via
legislation when it perceives that its citizens are not receiving fair treatment
in U.S. courts.168
The second reason for the discordant opinions lies with a separate issue
that arises when federal courts determine citizenship of corporate litigants
based on other countries' nationality laws. Corporate citizenship in U.S.
federal courts is based on the corporation's place of incorporation and prin-
cipal place of business.169 However, when courts consider other countries'
laws, anomalies may result. In some countries, a corporation may not be
considered a citizen at all. For example, the Matimak court noted that the
British Nationality Act does not apply to corporations and instead found
that "'the privileges of British nationality are not conferred on corporations
formed under the laws of Hong Kong." 170  The court then continued to
hold that, even if the British Nationality Act did apply to corporations, citi-
zens of the British Dependent Territories are not citizens of Great Britain.
17 1
On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit in Wilson found that, since corpora-
tions are citizens of the state where they were incorporated, a Cayman Is-
lands corporation is a citizen of the "United Kingdom and its Colonies"
because the British Nationality Act confers such citizenship to British De-
REv. 913, 913-17 (1983); Walter V. Schaefer, Reliance on the Law of the Circuit - A Req-
uiem, 1985 DUKE L.J. 690, 692 (1985) [hereinafter Schaefer, Reliance on the Law of the Cir-
cuit]. Defenders of this result submit that intercircuit conflict allows the Supreme Court to
achieve more informed and just decisions from the "percolation" of ideas among the circuits.
See Walter V. Schaefer, Reducing Circuit Conflicts, 69 A.B.A. L 452, 453 (1983) [hereinaf-
ter Schaefer, Reducing Circuit Conflicts]. Opponents of this result argue that uniformity in
federal law is the foundation of "the judicial article of the Constitution." See id. Therefore,
courts of appeals should strive to create a coherent system of federal law. These theories
aside, in some legal areas a great need for uniformity exists. Some examples which come to
mind are patent and federal tax law. But see Wallace, supra at 917-919 (arguing that "uni-
formity should remain a secondary concern because ... conflicts are not intrinsically intoler-
able. . . ."). It is also plain that as the "litigation explosion" continues, the laws among the
circuits may become more discordant. See Schaefer, Reducing Circuit Conflicts, supra at
452.168 See Neuhaus, supra note 12, at 1098.
169 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (1997).
170 Matimak, 118 F.3d at 85-86 (citing Windert Watch, 468 F. Supp. at 1246 (citing Brit-
ish Companies Act 1948 § 406)).
171 Matimak, 118 F.3d at 86.
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pendent Territory citizens. 7 2 The question thus remains: When should
American law determining corporate citizenship yield to foreign countries'
laws regarding the same? The Second Circuit articulated the rule that "a
foreign state is entitled to define who are its citizens or subjects." 174 How-
ever, to what extent should foreign law affect the jurisdiction of United
States federal courts?
These questions are not easily answered nor does this article purport to
answer them. This article does suggest that this route, presently taken by
federal courts, does not lead to uniform treatment of similarly situated cor-
porations. In addition, the process presently taken by federal courts re-
quires federal courts to master the nationality laws of any country
possessing a dependent territory, thus confronting federal courts with a
battery of elaborate and often times convoluted law.
B. The Second Solution
The second option would require federal courts to defer to executive
requests regarding which foreign litigants may enter the federal courts when
recognition is an issue. Federal courts have employed this option most of-
ten in cases of foreign sovereign immunities.17 5 In Transportes Aereos de
Angola v. Ronair, Inc., a district court in Delaware found that it had juris-
diction over an airline that was an instrumentality of the Angolan govern-
ment, a government not recognized by the United States. The court
allowed the action to continue "[b]ecause the executive branch, through the
Departments of Commerce and State, ha[d] clearly indicated that this suit
172 Wilson v. Humphreys (Cayman) Ltd., 916 F.2d 1239, 1242 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. de-
nied, 499 U.S. 947 (1991).
173 Judge Altimari, in his Matimak dissent, addressed this issue: "[I]t is time to reevaluate
whether our courts should look to foreign laws to determine who are foreign citizens for
purposes of United States' alienage diversity jurisdiction. We would not allow foreign law
to grant privileges in the United States, why should we allow foreign law to deny privileges
afforded under the Constitution? It is undisputed that the privileges of British nationality are
not conferred upon corporations formed under the laws of Hong Kong." Matimak, 118 F.3d.
at 89 (Atimari, J., dissenting).
174 Matimak, 118 F.3d at 85 (citing United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 668
(1898)).
175 See generally Republic of Liberia v. Bickford, 787 F. Supp. 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1992);
National Petrochemical Co. v. M/T Stolt Sheaf, 860 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1988).
176 See Transportes Aereos de Angola v. Ronair, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 858, 863-64 (D. Del.
1982). It should be noted that in this case, the section of the diversity statute in question was
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(4) as opposed to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2). For the distinction, see supra
note 43. As is the case with the section of the jurisdictional statute involving aliens, the
courts have uniformly held that to benefit from 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2), a foreign state must
be a recognized foreign state. See Iran Handicraft and Carpet Export Center v. Majan Inter-
national Corporation, 655 F. Supp. 1275, 1277 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 19:130 (1998)
should be allowed to go forward .... 177 Absent this statement from the
executive branch, the court would not have had jurisdiction over the case. 178
This solution to our problem is appealing since it would give the politi-
cal branches the final word in matters involving international policy.' 79
Courts strive to avoid doing this. However, it is possible that when decid-
ing whether the executive branch has recognized a state courts may inad-
vertently upset executive policy. By deferring to the executive branch's
pronouncements, courts will assuredly avoid this result. Thus, in the Mati-
mak case, the Second Circuit should have yielded to the amicus brief issued
by the Justice Department and assumed jurisdiction over Matimak.
Two difficulties would arise if courts followed this solution. The first
one presented is similar to the one described above. It concerns the need
for uniform treatment of similarly situated litigants. Allowing the executive
branch to intervene in litigation at will would expose the judicial system to
political fluctuations that commonly occur. Litigants would be uncertain as
to their standing in court from day-to-day since the executive branch, at any
time, could decide that it is in the United States' best interest to refuse to
allow a certain group of citizens to enter federal court. This uncertainty
could trigger reactions from other countries that are contrary to the interests
of the United States. 80
One response to this concern is that the executive branch is solely re-
sponsible for foreign relations. Therefore, any executive action is presuma-
bly mindful of any potential international consequences stemming from
such action. Thus, the executive branch's request to provide (or not to pro-
vide) a federal forum for certain citizens does not threaten executive policy
since the executive branch would be making the decision. However, politi-
cal decisions are commonly made in tempestuous times and such decisions
are occasionally regretted. 81 The judiciary, on the other hand, is consid-
177 Transportes Aereos de Angola, 544"F. Supp. at 864.
178 See id. In Matimak the state department issued an amicus brief in which it requested
that the court allow Matimak to remain in federal court. However, the Second Circuit de-
clined to do so. See Matimak, 118 F.3d at 86.
179 "Who is the sovereign, de jure or de facto, of a territory, is not a judicial, but a politi-
cal question, the determination of which by the legislative and executive departments of any
government conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers, citizens, and subjects
of that government." Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890). "The conduct of the
foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and
legislative - 'the political' - departments of the government, and the propriety of what
may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or deci-
sion." Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918).
180 See generally supra note 12 and accompanying text.
181 A modem example is the infamous "three strike" legislation enacted against repeat of-
fenders. Judging from the proliferation of articles debating these laws, the wisdom of this
legislation is certainly controversial. See Ilene M. Shinbein, "Three Strikes and You're
Out": A Good Political Slogan to Reduce Crime, But a Failure in its Application, 22 NEW
ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIv. CONFRIEMENT 175 (1996); Meredith McClain, "Three Strikes and
You're Out": The Solution to the Repeat Offender Problem?, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 97
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ered beyond politics, the branch that provides a "sober second thought. 18 2
Subjecting the judiciary to the passions of politics could undermine both
national and international perceptions of our separation of powers.
1 3
The most problematic area of this solution rests with the notion of a
"foreign state" as it applies to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2). The term "foreign
state" as applied by the courts to the diversity statute embraces only those
foreign states recognized by the executive branch. The executive branch
will never recognize Hong Kong and other dependent territories as foreign
states since they are subservient to other sovereign foreign states.18 4 De-
pendent territories can never meet the criteria set by the definition of a
"state" in both international law and as articulated by the Supreme Court in
(1996); Christine Markel, A Swing and a Miss: California's Three Strikes Law, 17 WHITTIER
L. REV. 651 (1996); R. Daniel O'Connor, Defining the Strike Zone - An Analysis of the
Classification of Prior Convictions under the Federal "Three-Strikes and You're Out"
Scheme, 36 B.C. L. REV. 847 (1995); Victor S. Sze, A Tale of Three Strikes: Slogan Tri-
umphs over Substance as our Bumper-Sticker Mentality Comes Home to Roost, 28 LoY. L.A.
L. REv. 1047 (1995); Mark W. Owens, California's Three Strikes Law: Desperate Times
Require Desperate Measures - But Will It Work?, 26 PAC. L.J. 881 (1995); Keith C.
Owens, Comment, California's "Three Strikes" Debacle: A Volatile Mixture of Fear,
Vengeance, and Demagoguery Will Unravel the Criminal Justice System and Bring Califor-
nia to its Knees, 25 Sw. U. L. REv. 129 (1995); Benjamin C. Gonring, Has the Legislature
Thrown Us a Curve?: An Analysis of Wisconsin's "Three Strikes" Law, 1995 Wis. L. REV.
933 (1995); James Austin, "Three Strikes and You're Out": The Likely Consequences on the
Courts, Prisons, and Crime in California and Washington State, 14 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L.
REv. 239 (1994). Susan Savoca Twarog has compiled some interesting, and less controver-
sial, laws which, it would seem, were passed under moments of delusion. "No Person shall
polish fruit or any other food product by any insanitary or unclean process." SUSAN SAVOCA
TWARoG, A COMPENDIUM OF ODD LAWS 90 (1985) (quoting IOWA CODE § 170.28 (1969)).
"Whoever commits indecent waitering is guilty of a petty misdemeanor." Id. at 80 (quoting
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-14.2 (1984)).
Any person who shall distribute or port or cause or procure to be distributed or posted
any advertisement of any form or nature whatsoever of spirituous or intoxicating liquors,
which advertisement contains any reference whatever to any deceased ex-president of the
United States of America, either by the use of his name, his picture, quotations from his
writings or utterances, scenes purporting to be from his life or otherwise, shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor.
Id. at 19 (quoting MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.42 (1979)).
182 McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 343 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Stone,
The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARv. L. REv. 4, 25 (1936)).
113 Along the same line, federal courts alone possess the power to determine whether they
have jurisdiction. Should courts begin blindly to follow the executive branch's decrees, they
would be surrendering some of this power to the executive branch, an action which may be
untrue to the concept of separation of powers. See generally United States v. United Mine
Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258 , 292 (1947) ("If this Court did not have jurisdiction to
hear the appeal in the Shipp case, its order would have had to be vacated. But it was ruled
that only the Court itself could determine that question of law. Until it was found that the
Court had no jurisdiction, ' ... it had authority, from the necessity of the case, to make or-
ders to preserve the existing conditions and the subject of the petition. .. ." (quoting United
States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563, 572 (1906)).
" See supra pp. 146-147 and notes 79-80.
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Curtiss-Wright.185 Such a pronouncement by the executive branch would
violate both U.S. and international law. Therefore, although the executive
branch may want citizens of dependent territories to enter federal court via
alienage jurisdiction, courts that grant such requests would be extending
their jurisdiction beyond the confines set out by Congress in 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a)(2).
C. The Third Solution
The final option most effectively addresses the issues discussed above:
Congress should amend the diversity statute to more effectively define (a)
what the definition of a foreign state includes and (b) which entities from
foreign states should be allowed access to federal courts. However, before
Congress can take such action the parameters set by the Constitution re-
garding alienage jurisdiction must be gleaned. The Constitution sets the
outer parameters of the federal courts' jurisdiction and Congress is free to
work within these parameters to adjust federal court jurisdiction to its lik-
ing. If, in the case of alienage jurisdiction, the Constitution anticipates that
a "citizen of a foreign state" is a citizen of a recognized foreign state, then
any action by Congress expanding federal court jurisdiction beyond this
boundary would be unconstitutional. If, however, the Constitution sanc-
tions any non-U.S. citizen to sue as a citizen or subject of a foreign state,
then Congress could conceivably change the well-entrenched notion that
alienage jurisdiction requires that a party be a citizen or subject of a recog-
nized foreign state. The question is how to decide whether the Constitution
requires "minimal alienage" (litigants who are simply noncitizens of the
United States) or "complete alienage" (litigants who are citizens of recog-
nized foreign states).
Whether executive recognition of a state is a constitutional prerequisite
for aliens to be citizens of foreign states within the sphere of alienage juris-
diction is debatable; the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue. 86
Commentators have argued that at the time of the Constitution a "foreign
185 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936); The Montevideo
Convention, supra note 78.
186 The Supreme Court denied certiorari for both Matimak and Wilson. See Wilson v.
Humphreys (Cayman) Limited, 499 U.S. 947 (1991); Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily, 118
S. Ct. 883 (1998). An analogy may be drawn to diversity jurisdiction. Since Strawbridge v.
Curtiss, the question remained whether or not the Constitution dictated absolute diversity
among parties in diversity cases or whether this was a statutory mandate only. In State Farm
Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, the Court held that the Constitution required only minimal diver-
sity in diversity cases and that Congress, by statute, had narrowed the federal courts' juris-
diction by requiring complete diversity. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267
(1806); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967). See infra note
197 for another analogy drawn between diversity and alienage jurisdiction involving whether
the Constitution requires that parties to litigation be citizens of a "State" or a "foreign State"
in diversity cases or alienage cases, respectively.
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state" was any state other than the United States, recognized or not.1 87 If
this is taken as true, one could argue that all persons188 who are not citizens
of the United States are considered citizens of foreign states by the Consti-
tution.1s9
187 Christine Biancheria argues that the Constitution sanctions suits founded on alienage
jurisdiction between a citizen of the United States and a party not a citizen of the United
States, whether that party be a citizen of a recognized state or not. See Christine Biancheria,
Restoring the Right to Have Rights: Statelessness and Alienage Jurisdiction in Light of Abu-
Zeineh v. Federal Laboratories, Inc., 11 AM. U. J. INT'L. & POL'Y 195, 215 (1996). She
supports her stance with the argument that, at the framing of the Constitution, the notion of
statelessness as we know it today did not exist. See id. at 211.
A legislature, when drafting laws, clearly cannot anticipate all future circumstances, thus
necessitating a more dynamic method of statutory interpretation. At the time of the
writing of the Constitution and the enactment of the Judiciary Act of 1789 (and its revi-
sion in 1875), the phenomena of statelessness was virtually unknown. In fact the prob-
lems of statelessness did not emerge as a significant issue until after World War I."
Id. at 201-10. She cites Blair Holdings Corp. v. Rubenstein in which the court considered
statelessness: "problems associated with that status are of recent vintage." Blair Holdings
Corp. v. Rubenstein, 113 F. Supp. 496, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). See also Kletter v. Dulles, 111
F. Supp. 593, 598 (D. D.C. 1953) ("When Congress speaks of a 'foreign State,' it means a
country which is not the United States, or its possession or colony - an alien country -
other than our own, bearing in mind that the average American, when he speaks of a 'for-
eigner,' means an alien, non-American."). This argument is disputable since the phenome-
non of statelessness has been around for quite some time: Aristotle dubbed a stateless man "a
bird that flies alone." C. SECKLER-HUDsON, STATELESSNESS: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO
THE UNITED STATES 244 (1934). Perhaps the argument should not be that statelessness was
unknown to the framers, but that the effects and repercussions of statelessness in our modem
world could not have been anticipated by the framers.
Biancheria further argues that,
[plerhaps the strongest evidence that the framers contemplated inclusion of all aliens in
the grant ofjurisdiction lies in the original phrasing of the Judiciary Act of 1789, codify-ing alienagej*urisdiction as provided or in the Constitution. Initially, the Act permitted
infeeral court in any civil action involving more than $500, exclusive of costs,'where an alien is a party' without ny apparent qualification.
rd. at 211-12. Biancheria quotes Chief Justice Joseph Story, who wrote of the alienage juris-
diction clause in the Constitution, "The inquiry may here be made, who are to be deemed
aliens entitled to sue in the courts of the United States? The general answer is, any person
who is not a citizen of the United States." Id. at 211 (quoting JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 51,499 (5th ed. 1891)).
188 Corporate citizenship as it presently exists did not enter the legal arena until years af-
ter the Constitution's ratification. Only natural persons were believed to have the capacity to
be "citizens." The earliest consideration of this problem was in Bank of United States v. De-
veaux in which the Court held that a corporation could not be a citizen. The Court then de-
termined the diversity issue based on the "character of the individuals who compose" the
corporation. See Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch 61, 86,.91-92, 3 L. Ed. 38
(1809), overruled by Louisville, C. & C.R. Co. v. Letson, 2 How. 497, 558, 11 L. Ed. 353
(1844). For simplicity's sake, this article assumes that at the time of the Constitution, the
Deveaux standard would have been acceptable to the framers. Therefore, foreign corpora-
tions would be considered citizens of foreign states since all of the individuals composing
the corporation would presumably be citizens of that foreign state.
189 See Biancheria, supra note 187, at 211-12.
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The Matimak court addressed this argument and found it lacking. The
Second Circuit held that the Constitution permits federal courts to exercise
diversity jurisdiction only over those persons or entities that are citizens of
a recognized foreign state. 190 It supported its stance with the history of
statelessness and determined that, when the Constitution was adopted, the
notion of statelessness did not exist.19' Thus, every person or entity origi-
nating beyond the borders of the United States satisfied the requirements of
alienage jurisdiction, namely being a citizen or subject of a foreign state.
Any noncitizen of the United States could enter federal court; they were
certainly citizens of a foreign state since being stateless was impossible.
According to the Second Circuit, however, "[t]he basic assumption of the
framers - if indeed it was ever valid - no longer holds true: not every
'foreigner' is a citizen or subject of some foreign state.... [T]he term [for-
eigners] in 1787 did not include stateless persons - a category of people
unknown to the drafters of the Constitution. Thus, from the perspective
of the Second Circuit, the definition of a citizen of a foreign state is a static
one, one originating at the time of the framers. The introduction of state-
lessness to this equation does not affect what a citizen of a foreign state is:
Citizens of foreign states must satisfy the same criteria as they would in
1787. To be a "citizen of a foreign state," a litigant must not be stateless; to
avoid being stateless, a litigant must be a citizen of a recognized foreign
state. Such strict construction would pose difficult problems in any area in-
volving twentieth century litigation. For example, whether Congress could
confer the status of "citizen" on corporations would be questionable since,
at the founding of our Constitution, corporations could not be "citizens."'
93
An analogous situation was presented when Congress passed a juris-
dictional statute defining the term "State" as it applies to diversity jurisdic-
tion. In 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), Congress defines the word "State" to include
"the Territories, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico. 194 By doing so, Congress extended the diversity jurisdiction of the
federal courts to include citizens of those areas.1 95 Applying the Second
Circuit's analysis would make this congressional action unconstitutional:
At the Constitution's founding a "State" could include neither the District
of Columbia nor the commonwealths since those entities simply did not
190 See Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily, 118 F.3d 76, 87 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118
S. Ct. 883 (1998).
191 Id.
192 id.
193 See supra note 188.
194 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (1997).
195 "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter
in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is
between citizens of different States." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (1997).
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exist as they do today.196 The term "State" could not include, for instance,
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico since the relationship between Puerto
Rico and the United States had not yet developed.197 According to the rea-
soning of the Matimak opinion, by defining "State" as including Puerto
Rico, Congress unconstitutionally stretched the bounds of federal jurisdic-
tion as set by the Constitution. However, somehow Congress was able to
pass the statute, and, more importantly, pass it constitutionally. The Su-
196 Spain, with the Treaty of Paris, ceded Puerto Rico to America in 1898. See Ameri-
cana of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Kaplus, 368 F.2d 431,433 (3d Cir. 1966) (citing Treaty of Paris,
Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754, 1755). Juan M. Garcia-Passalacqua provides an elegant in-
sight into Puerto Rico's history:
From the sea came the people - the first ones in canoes from Venezuela or Central
America. From then on, sporadic waves of people came from the sea. The discoverers as
well as the colonizers came originally from Spain; later, the immigrants from Europe and
South America. Also from the sea came the attackers: first the Caribe Indians, then the
British, French, Dutch, and the corsairs, or pirates. And in 1898 came the Americans.
Next to hurricanes, epochs in our oral history among coastal people were established on
the basis of the arrival of ships that brought the Spanish situado from Mexico to keep the
colony alive, or a new governor, or bishop.
JUAN M. GARCIA-PASSALACQUA, PUERTO Rico EQUALITY AND FREEDOM AT IssUE 16 (1984).
David Brinkley explains the interesting conception of Washington, D.C.:
Two states, Maryland and Virginia, offered both land and money. They would provide
between them one hundred square miles of land, on both sides of the Potomac River, and
would give $192,000 for new government buildings. An attractive offer, but still not
good enough to end the rivalries among the states until Alexander Hamilton, the first sec-
retary of the treasury under the new Constitution, saw a chance to make a deal. He
wanted the new federal government to assume responsibility for the debts the individual
state governments had run up during the Revolution. He saw that those to whom the
debts were owed were mostly wealth and influential men; if the new central government
owed them money, they would be more likely to work for its survival and stability. The
Southern states opposed this idea, because most of those who were owed money were
Northerners. And the money to pay the debt would have to be raised by increasing the
government's only real source of revenue, the tariff on imports, which the Southerners
also opposed because they, more than the North, were a rural, ararian people dependent
on imported manufactured goods. Hamilton got his way only agreeing to support a
new capital city in the South, on the Potomac River. On July 15, 1790, Congress voted to
remain in Philadelphia for ten years and then move to a new "Federal City" to be con-
structed somewhere along the Potomac. And so Washington, D.C., was born as it was to
live - with a political deal.
DAVID BRINKLEY, WASHINGTON GoEs TO WAR 4 (1988).
197 Chief Justice Marshall held that federal courts could not exercise diversity jurisdiction
over citizens of the District of Columbia or citizens of U.S. territories in Hepburn & Dundas
v. ElIzey and Corporation of New Orleans v. Winter respectively. See Hepburn & Dundas v.
Ellzey, 2 L. Ed. 332 (1804); Corporation of New Orleans v. Winter, 4 L. Ed. 44 (1816).
Professor Wright takes the view that the Hepburn opinion "seem[s] to suggest[ ] that only
the [diversity] statute, rather than the Constitution, precluded diversity jurisdiction in suits
between a citizen of the District of Columbia and a citizen of a state." WRIGHT, supra note
33, at 155. If this is accepted, an analogy between alienage and diversity jurisdiction again
may be drawn. If the Constitution does not require that parties in a diversity case be strictly
citizens of a "State," then why should it require parties in an alienage case be strictly citizens
of a "foreign State?" Also see note 186, supra, for a different analogy drawn between diver-
sity and alienage jurisdiction: whether executive recognition is constitutionally required be-
fore an alien can be considered a citizen of a "foreign state" for alienage jurisdiction
purposes.
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preme Court upheld 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) with respect to citizens of District
of Columbia in National Mutual Insurance Co. of District of Columbia v.
Tidewater Transfer Co.198 Using the same rationale as in National Mutual,
the Third Circuit upheld the statute with respect to citizens of Puerto Rico
in Americana of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Kaplus. 
t
Should Congress find that the Constitution allows for "minimal alien-
age," it could pass an amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) to extend fed-
eral courts' jurisdiction to include corporate citizens of dependent
territories.200 The language of the amendment could be as simple as that of
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). For example, the amendment could read, "'Foreign
state' for purposes of section (a)(2) applies only to recognized foreign states
and their dependencies." To avoid the problem Matimak presents, the
amendment could also state that "'citizen' for purposes of section (a)(2) ap-
plies only to citizens of recognized foreign states and their dependencies,
and to corporations incorporated in, and which maintain their principal
place of business in, a recognized foreign state and/or their dependencies."
This language would preserve alienage jurisdiction for corporations incor-
porated in dependent territories while maintaining the common law regard-
198 Overruling Hepburn & Dundas v. ElIzey, which held that diversity jurisdiction did not
exist between a District citizen and a citizen of a state, the Court held that Congress could
empower the federal courts to hear diversity cases of this kind. Treaty of Paris, Dec. 10,
1898, 30 Stat. 1754, 1755. See generally Hepburn and Dundas v. Ellzey, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch)
445 (1805). However, the Court was badly split and it seems that the only issue on which
five of the Justices could agree was on this point:
The Act before us, as we see it, is not a resort by Congress to these means'to reach for-
bidden ends. Rather, Congress is reaching permissible ends by a choice of means which
certainly are not expressly forbidden by the Constitution. No good reason is advanced
for the Court to deny them by implication. In no matter should we pay more deference to
the opinions of Congress than in its choice of instrumentalities to perform a function that
is within its power. To put federally administered justice within the reach of District citi-
zens, in claims against citizens of another state, is an object which Congress has a right to
accomplish. Its own carefully considered view that it has the power and that it is neces-
sary and proper to utilize United States District Courts as means to this end, is entitled to
great respect. Our own ideas as to the wisdom or desirability of such a statute or the con-
stitutional provision authorizing it are totally irrelevant. Such a law of Congress should
be stricken down only on a clear showing that it transgresses constitutional limitations.
We think no such showing has been made. The Act is valid.
National Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., Inc., 337 U.S. 582, 603-04 (1948).
199 After determining that Puerto Rico was a "territory" of the United States, the Third
Circuit held that "Article IV, Section 3, provides the requisite constitutional authority for the
1956 [diversity] amendment .... " Americana of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Kaplus 368 F.2d 431,
436 (3d Cir. 1966). Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution states: "The Congress shall
have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Terri-
tory or other Property belonging to the United States.... ." U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3.
200 Even if the Constitution requires "complete alienage," it could plausibly be argued
that Congress can constitutionally amend the alienage diversity statute by exercising powers
granted it under the "necessary and proper" clause. See supra note 160 and accompanying
text.
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ing corporations incorporated abroad but with their principal place of busi-
ness in the United States (or vice versa).20 1
Granting alienage jurisdiction over corporations from dependent terri-
tories will ensure that the outside world perceives the United States and its
courts as fair and neutral. This stability will enhance foreign relations with
sovereigns of these dependent territories. No more opinions would declare
corporations in dependant territories stateless, a status offensive to interna-
tional law.20 2 In addition, these corporations would have the opportunity to
avoid discrimination that may exist at local levels. It seems uncontroversial
that a guaranteed neutral forum would encourage these corporations to do
business in the United States, thus continuing America's economic growth
while furthering economic development in dependent territories. Most im-
portantly, however, such an amendment would show other sovereign na-
tions that the United States is dedicated to a fair and just legal system for
citizens and foreigners alike.
VI. CONCLUSION
Even though our stateless but Iranian born friend remains stranded in
Charles de Gaulle Airport, he retains some options.
In 1995, Belgium offered Mr. Nasseri the opportunity to settle there, if he
agreed to live under the supervision of a social worker. With his heart set on
Britain, Mr. Nasseri refused the offer. Belgium's offer still stands, airport offi-
cials say. In addition, Mr. Nasseri could benefit from an immigration measure
under consideration by the French Senate. It would allow him to claim resi-
dency papers in France because he has spent more than five years on national
territory.... 203
Matimak's story is not so encouraging: The Supreme Court denied
certiorari on January 26, 1998 relegating Matimak to state court as a state-
less corporation.2 4 Whether Matimak should be considered stateless only
in the context of the alienage diversity statute remains unclear. However, a
declaration by a federal court of appeals that a corporation, or individual for
that matter, is stateless should pique the interests of the international com-
munity. Statelessness is a status devoid of international rights; a status "de-
plored in the international community of democracies."
20 5
201 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
202 "Nearly fifty years ago, the United Nations (U.N.) issued a study denouncing state-
lessness, finding that '[t]he fact that the stateless person has no nationality places him in an
abnormal and inferior position which reduces his social value and destroys his own self-
confidence."' Biancheria, supra note 187, at 200 (quoting United Nations Dep't of Social
Affairs, A Study of Statelessness at 139, U.N. Doc. E/ 1112, U.N. Sales No. 1949.XIV.2
(1949)).
203 Patton, supra note 2.
204 Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily, 118 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
883 (1998).
205 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958) (Warren, C.J.).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 19:130 (1998)
Federal courts have construed the alienage diversity statute as requiring
that to be a citizen of a foreign state, the litigant must be a citizen of a rec-
ognized foreign state. Dependent territories are not, nor could ever be, rec-
ognized foreign states under the standards of American common law and
international law. Congress should address this problem with an amend-
ment to the alienage diversity statute so that federal courts can indisputably,
certainly, and legally exercise jurisdiction over corporations from depend-
ent territories. An amendment would also grant federal courts the independ-
ence to decide cases without addressing foreign relations issues or
interpreting nationality laws of other nations.
Furthermore, such an amendment would send an undeniable message
to other countries that the United States supports a neutral legal system for
foreign corporations. Such a message would encourage continued eco-
nomic growth in both the United States and dependent territories. In addi-
tion, it would prevent federal courts from holding that corporations from
dependent territories are stateless as the Matimak court did. Such holdings
are surely offensive to sovereigns of dependent territories. Therefore, most
importantly, the amendment would aid foreign relations not just with de-
pendent territories but with their sovereigns.
